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REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
STATE CAPACITY
MARTIN W. SYBBLIS*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores an underlying tension in the regulatory
competition literature regarding why some jurisdictions are more
attractive to firms than others. It pays special attention to offshore
financial centers (OFCs). OFCs court the business of nonresidents,
offer business friendly regulatory environments, and provide for
minimal, if any, taxation on their customers. On the one extreme,
OFCs are theorized as merely products of legislative capture—
thereby lacking any meaningful agency of their own. On the other
hand, OFCs are conceptualized as well-governed jurisdictions that
attract investment because of the high quality of their laws and legal
institutions—indicating some ability to manage legislative capture.
This Article argues that the prevailing explanatory frameworks
for OFC development and success overlook deeper institutional
structures within these jurisdictions. Drawing on the political
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sociology literature on state development, this Article offers a new
theoretical framework. It suggests that some OFCs may have
experienced more success than others because of how they developed “state capacity”—i.e., their ability to formulate and implement
specific kinds of policy choices skillfully and effectively. This Article
makes two important contributions to the regulatory competition
and OFC literatures. First, it places the institutional quality of
jurisdictions at the center of the discourse and analysis of OFC
achievements in the business law arena. Second, it introduces the
interdisciplinary concept of “state capacity” into the growing
scholarly debate concerning the rise of OFCs.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores an underlying tension regarding how
the competition for corporate charters is conceived. The regulatory competition literature seeks to explain why some jurisdictions are more attractive to corporations and other business
entities compared to others.1 The prevailing scholarship argues
that successful jurisdictions engage in a race to the bottom and
are fueled primarily by legislative capture.2 In this kind of race,
jurisdictions compete with each other to provide corporate charters by enacting laws that benefit managers at the expense of
shareholders.3 Jurisdictions are able to do so because legislators
are beholden to special interests.4 Nowhere is this theoretical
framework more prevalent than where it concerns the rise and
competitiveness of offshore financial centers (OFCs).5 These jurisdictions are generally defined as having: “(i) [a] primary orientation of business toward nonresidents; (ii) [a] favorable regulatory
environment (low supervisory requirements and minimal information disclosure) and; (iii) low- or zero-taxation schemes.”6 Unlike
the tax haven label, which is also attached to OFC jurisdictions,
the “[OFC] concept avoids [the] exclusive focus on tax.”7
1 See William Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV.
1403, 1406 (2020) [hereinafter Moon, Delaware’s New Competition]; Eric L.
Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition,
101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1748–51 (2015).
2 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974); Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1413.
3 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1413.
4 Id.
5 According to William Moon:
Legislative capture is a phenomenon especially vulnerable to the
governments of small offshore jurisdictions looking to convert
lawmaking authority into staple revenue streams. It is no secret
that private parties work intimately with local legislatures in
offshore financial havens.
William Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2019)
[hereinafter Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance].
6 Ahmed Zorome, Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an
Operational Definition 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/87,
2007); see also Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 48–49.
7 CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET
DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 23 (2016).
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An important feature of OFCs is “a more general focus on
cross-border services” and a significant “reliance on financial
services for nonresidents.”8 According to some narratives, approximately 19 trillion dollars in wealth (personal and corporate) are
said to be held in OFCs.9 By other accounts, “about 10% of world
[Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] is held in [OFCs] globally.”10
Further, some small jurisdiction OFCs “have become big players in
cross-border financial services,” siphoning immense capital away
from powerful countries.11
OFCs have garnered special attention over the past two
decades because of “concerns regarding money laundering and
terrorism financing following the 9/11 attacks in 2001.”12 The
Panama and Paradise papers debacles have also helped to draw
attention to these secretive jurisdictions where the wealthy hide
their money from their home tax authorities.13 More recently,
OFC jurisdictions have been identified as “corporate law havens”
due to the growing number of companies using them as their
place of incorporation.14 But, despite their poor reputations, some
scholars have argued that OFCs are well-governed and attribute
their growth, in part, to the quality of their governance.15 According
Id.
See Jannick Damgaard et al., Piercing the Veil, 55 FINA. & DEV. 51, 52
(2018).
10 Annette Alstadsaeter et al., Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro
Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.
Working Paper No. 23805, 2017).
11 BRUNER, supra note 7, at 3.
12 Id.
13 See Will Fitzgibbon & Michael Hudson, Five Years Later, Panama Papers Still Having a Big Impact, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS
(Apr. 3, 2021), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/five-years-later
-panama-papers-still-having-a-big-impact/ [https://perma.cc/GC2Y-9DKN].
14 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1409 (arguing that
OFCs tend to offer more favorable regulatory environments than the natural
home jurisdiction for the companies).
15 See Dhammika Dharmapala & James Hines, Which Countries Become
Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058, 1058–59 (2009) [hereinafter Dharmapala
& Hines, Which Countries]; ANNA MANASCO DIONNE & JONATHAN R. MACEY,
Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets: Racing to the Bottom, or Moving
Toward Efficient, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY
COMPETITION 26 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010); Andrew P. Morriss & Clifford
C. Henson, Regulatory Effectiveness of Offshore Financial Centers, 53 VA. J.
INT’L L. 417, 425 (2013).
8
9
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to this view, it is feasible that well-governed countries choose to
become OFCs because they are more likely to see greater returns—
i.e., “higher foreign investment flows, and economic benefits that
accompany them.”16 Consistent with the attention to “good governance” is the argument that OFCs provide a crucial service by
“promoting the development of innovative regulatory regimes that
offer improved asset and risk management and financial planning.”17 This good governance perspective seems to undermine the
thrust of the legislative capture narrative and suggests an apparent contradiction in the literature.18
There appears to be two divergent perspectives. On the one
hand, OFCs are merely products of legislative capture, thereby
lacking any meaningful agency of their own.19 On the other
hand, OFCs are well-governed jurisdictions that attract investment
because of the high quality of their laws and legal institutions,
indicating some ability to manage legislative capture.20
This Article seeks to reconcile these two positions. This
Article argues that the legislative capture and good governance
explanations for OFC competitiveness overlook deeper sociohistories and institutional structures that influence how well some
jurisdictions are able to compete for corporate charters.21 This is a
critical omission with immense significance for economic development in non-OFC jurisdictions. If OFCs have special institutional
backgrounds, their developmental trajectories may provide an
invaluable roadmap for how institutions, especially those that
are legal in nature, can be utilized for economic growth purposes.22
16 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1059 (“American
evidence is consistent with this explanation, in that tax rate differences among
well-governed countries are associated with much larger differences in U.S. investment levels than are tax rate differences among poorly governed countries.”).
17 DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 7.
18 Id.
19 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1411 (“[L]awmakers
in these jurisdictions are ‘captured’ by foreign corporations by being heavily
reliant on annual incorporation fees for government revenue.”).
20 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1059 (“suggest[ing] that governance quality is an important, and hitherto largely neglected,
factor affecting the tax elasticity of foreign investment”); DIONNE & MACEY,
supra note 15, at 9 (“[O]ffshore regimes guard against excessive regulatory
burdens and support innovation in financial products and services and flexible
regulatory regimes.”).
21 See infra Section I.B.3.
22 See infra Section III.B.
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Drawing on the political sociology literature concerning
state development, this Article argues that some OFCs may be
more successful than others due to how they developed “state
capacity”—i.e., their ability to formulate and implement policy
choices, as well as enforce legal rules skillfully and effectively in
a chosen arena or economic sector.23 Consider Delaware’s legendary success in the area of corporate law.24 Commentators
agree that much of Delaware’s gains in attracting firms for incorporation is a direct result of the expertise honed and embodied
in the corporate law bar and the Delaware Court of Chancery,
the state’s specialized business court.25
See BRUNER, supra note 7; infra Parts II, III (discussing successful and failed
OFCs, which Bruner refers to as Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions
(“MDSJs”)); see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND
WORLD ORDER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7 (2004) (defining state capacity
as “the ability of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly
and transparently”).
Scholars have long studied the types of capabilities that make jurisdictions
successful in economic development. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael Trebilcock,
The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics,
56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 902–05 (2008). While economists, political scientists,
and sociologists have been at the forefront of this research agenda, with the
notable exception of law and development scholars, legal scholars have largely
taken a backseat. See, e.g., DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY
NATIONS FAIL 4 (2012); DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 6 (2007); ATUL KOHLI, STATE
DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL POWER AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE
GLOBAL PERIPHERY 1 (2004) [hereinafter KOHLI, STATE DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT];
DIANE DAVIS, DISCIPLINE AND DEVELOPMENT: MIDDLE CLASSES AND PROSPERITY IN EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 5 (2004); see also Davis & Trebilcock,
supra, at 902–05; David M. Trubek, Law and Development: 40 Years After
‘Scholars in Self Estrangement’, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 301, 329 (2016). Consequently, the more conspicuous examples of effective states in the area of economic development have tended to come outside of commercial and corporate
law arenas with special emphasis on issues of democracy, poverty, education,
healthcare, and the like. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra, at 902–05.
24 See, e.g., Roberto Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. ORG. 225, 226 (1985); Marcel Kahan, The Demand for
Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?,
22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 344 (2006).
25 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1437. But see
Sarath Sanga, The Origins of the Market for Corporate Law 20 (March 3, 2020),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503628 [https://perma.cc/C48G-NF2Z] (suggesting
23
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The Court of Chancery offers distinct advantages to corporations including, but not limited to, judges with expertise in
corporate law and a well-developed body of judicial opinions.26
These features are a crucial part of the “network benefits [that
emanate] from [its] longstanding status as the leading incorporation jurisdiction,” and its demonstrated commitment to corporate
law.27 These attributes required time and a confluence of social,
economic and political experiences to develop.28 Delaware’s Court
of Chancery draws on 220 plus years of rich institutional history.29
This history suggests that how an institution develops could be
relevant to its long-term success.30
OFCs that effectively compete with Delaware for corporate
charters31 may also be the products of a specific kind of institutional history.32 While OFCs rely on input from transnational
lawyers, accountants, and bankers, their capabilities may also
emanate from other sources, including colonial histories that
encouraged a sustained engagement with the rule of law.33
This Article seeks to promote a well-needed and long
overdue assessment of the OFC enterprise from the ground up—i.e.,

that “the market for corporate charters emerged as a collateral consequence
of interstate commerce”).
26 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 708–15 (2002) (discussing the impact of the
Court of Chancery on Delaware’s attractiveness to corporations).
27 Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998).
28 See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 26, at 708.
29 See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 819–20 (1993).
30 See David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING
LEGAL CULTURES 21 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
31 See, e.g., Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1437; Lucian
Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law? 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 9380, 2002).
32 See, e.g., Yon-Shik Lee, General Theory of Law and Development, 50
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415, 436–46 (2019) (discussing the importance of regulatory design to law and development theory).
33 See infra Parts III, IV; see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE CONFOUNDING
ISLAND: JAMAICA AND THE POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENT 94–96 (2019); Ronald J.
Daniels et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111,
127 (2011).
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from the perspective of OFCs, as opposed to non-OFC (onshore)
jurisdictions. It specifically contemplates institution building for
purposes of economic growth from a law and sociology perspective.34 Sociologists understand institutions to be more than the
“rules of the game.” This is the definition often used by some
economists and legal scholars.35 Instead, sociologists conceive of
institutions as far more complex.36 For example, according to
historical sociologist Orlando Patterson:
Institutions are durable structures of knowledge that define
the rules and expectations of recurrent behavior. They range from
weakly sanctioned, intermittent interactions (such as ritualized greetings) to formally sanctioned, continuous networks of
rules, roles, and activities designed to achieve specific goals,
such as organizations. Nearly all institutions involve formal
and informal norms and are efficient to the degree that the two
are smoothly coupled. An important aspect of institutions is
institutional strength. Formal institutional rules may or may
not be enforced and, instead of stably taking root, are often
contested, violated, and changed.37

While scholars of development have long celebrated state
leadership and high-quality institutions—including legal institutions—as crucial for late economic growth, few legal scholars
have attempted to analyze the social conditions that led to the
effectiveness of those states that became successful.38 For the
first time, this Article brings in the political sociology literature on
bureaucratic quality to help make sense of the legal scholarship
on the regulatory competitiveness of OFCs.39 To date, these literatures have developed independently and persist in intellectual
See infra Part IV.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4 (1990); see Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical
Economic Development: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1018–23 (2011) [hereinafter Thomas, Institutions].
Similarly, legal scholars have long considered law relevant for national development but have paid insufficient attention to the embeddedness of law in
society and how this impacts development outcomes. See Davis & Trebilcock,
supra note 23, at 905.
36 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 23–24.
37 See id.
38 See Thomas, Institutions, supra note 35, at 1018–23.
39 See infra Part IV.
34
35
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silos.40 By connecting the theoretical insights from both, this Article sheds light on how scholars and policymakers may be able to
learn from the experience of a group of what may be considered
developmental jurisdictions: those capable of strategically intervening in the economy to promote economic growth.41
This Article suggests that a jurisdiction’s well-honed capabilities in a particular domain42—i.e., “state capacity”—provides a
See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3–6 (2006); Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23,
at 905. In legal scholarship, more emphasis has been placed on institutional
quality, with distinctions made between formal and informal norms, as well
as between the enforcement and under-enforcement of rules. See, e.g., DAM,
supra, at 17–23. With respect to the norms literature, scholars have suggested that social norms may replace formal law in some circumstances and be
just, if not more, effective. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES i (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out
of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.L. STUD. 115, 115 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996); see also Bryan H. Druzin, Social
Norms as a Substitute for Law, 79 ALBANY L. REV. 67, 67 (2016). Regarding
the matter of enforcement, scholars suggest that the efficacy of law is directly
tied to how well it is enforced. DAM, supra, at 93. For example, Kenneth Dam
argues that “no degree of improvement in substantive law—even world ‘best
practice’ substantive law—will bring the rule of law to a country that does
not have effective enforcement.” Id. The prevailing assumption appears to be
that the right type of rules (formal or informal and accounting for social context) combined with adequate enforcement will achieve the desired policy goals.
See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent Objections, 60 U.
TORONTO L.J. 537, 552 (2010).
41 See infra Section III.B; David M. Trubek, The Political Economy of the
Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New Developmental State, 1 HAGUE J. RULE
L. 28, 31 (2009).
42 As discussed in Part II, jurisdictions may have strengths in particular
economic sectors or domains. For example, in the public health arena consider
the various responses to the COVID-19 pandemic across developed and developing countries. See Ryan Heath & Beatrice Jin, Ranking the Global Impact of
the Coronavirus Pandemic, Country by Country, POLITICO (May 21, 2020), https://
www.politico.com/interactives/2020/ranking-countries-coronavirus-impact/
[https://perma.cc/M6AS-XHRE]; Ian Bremmer, The Best Global Response to
Covid-19 Pandemic, TIME (June 12, 2020), https://time.com/5851633/best-global-re
sponses-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/C9CY-FZGP]; Roosa Tikkanen et al., The 2020
International Profiles of Health Care Systems: A Useful Resource for Interpreting Country Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2020/2020-international-profiles-use
ful-resource-interpreting-responses-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/MT54-NNFV].
40
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framework for conceptualizing regulatory competitiveness.43 OFCs
have primarily been framed and analyzed in the context of international tax and corporate law.44 This Article takes a different
track by engaging in an institutional analysis of OFCs. This
raises the stakes in the OFC debate by focusing on the quality of
institutional learning in a jurisdiction as one key variable for
predicting its competitiveness for corporate charters, as well as

While it is still too early to determine the long-term effectiveness of state
responses to COVID-19, commentators made some early observations. See Heath
& Jin, supra. According to The Atlantic magazine, Bhutan—one of the least
developed countries with a per capita GDP of $3,412—has been “the unlikeliest pandemic success story.” Madeline Drexler, The Unlikeliest Pandemic Success
Story: How Did a Tiny, Poor Nation Manage to Suffer Only One Death from
the Coronavirus, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com
/international/archive/2021/02/coronavirus-pandemic-bhutan/617976/ [https://
perma.cc/NPM7-HA8C]. As of January 2021—a little over a year after COVID-19
ravaged complex health systems and devastated wealthy economies—Bhutan
had only one COVID-19 related death compared to almost 400,000 in the
United States in about the same time frame. Id.; Ralph Ellis et al., US Approaches 400,000 Coronavirus Deaths, CNN (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.cnn
.com/2021/01/18/health/us-coronavirus-monday/index.html [https://perma.cc
/2QG9-DRBG].
Perhaps what is most remarkable about this nation of 760,000 people is
that it has approximately 337 doctors, “less than half the World Health Organization’s recommended ratio of doctors to people—and only one of these
physicians had advanced training in critical care.” Drexler, supra. To many,
every indication was that countries like Bhutan with an inadequate health
infrastructure could not feasibly manage a pandemic. Id. Yet the government
began preparing for the virus’s onslaught in early January 2020, and by March
had implemented effective screening, contact tracing, regular health updates, and
the containment of public gatherings. Id. The country’s leaders also “launched a
relief fund that has so far handed out $19 million in assistance to more than
34,000 Bhutanese whose livelihoods have been hurt by the pandemic.” Id.
Commentators note that Bhutan’s response to COVID-19 was a product of
leaders leaning on the country’s other strengths, including “mutual trust,”
engaged leadership and good preparation in light of weaknesses, and the skillful
coordination of existing resources. Id. In this regard, the small developing
nation has important lessons for bigger and wealthier countries, namely how
states can plan and execute policies to achieve complex goals that countries with
more wealth and resources struggle to accomplish. See, e.g., PETER BLAIR HENRY,
TURNAROUND: THIRD WORLD LESSONS FOR FIRST WORLD GROWTH 135–50 (2013).
43 See, e.g., Miguel Centeno et al., Unpacking States in the Developing World:
Capacity, Performance, and Politics, in STATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1–
34 (Miguel Centeno et al. eds., 2017).
44 See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 3.
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economic growth more broadly. This approach provides invaluable
insights into a broad range of national and subnational levels of
government interested in coordinating business laws and various
actors for purposes of enhancing economic activity.45
This Article makes two important contributions to the
regulatory competition and OFC literatures. First, it places the
institutional quality of states at the center of the discourse and
analysis of jurisdictional achievements in the business law arena.46
Second, it introduces the interdisciplinary concept of state capacity
into the longstanding scholarly debate concerning the growing
prominence of OFCs.47
The remainder of this Article is organized into four parts.
Part I discusses the prevailing viewpoints in the regulatory competition literature.48 Specifically, it suggests that prominent theories incorrectly relegate OFCs to passive jurisdictions that are
rule-takers, as opposed to rule-makers. This view undervalues
the agency of these jurisdictions and undertheorizes the role of
well-honed capabilities in their economic development efforts.49
Part II draws attention to the developing literature on state
capacity from political sociology.50 This Part further suggests a
need for legal scholars to keenly contemplate a role for the relationship between policy choices and bureaucratic competence in
the regulatory competition arena.51 Part III demonstrates the
connection between policy choices and bureaucratic competence
by way of an overview of the development of a set OFCs with
similar colonial backgrounds and development trajectories.52 This
Part focuses on colonies with ties to Britain, given the strong
See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 24; see also BRUNER, supra note 7, at
3–4; Kevin E. Davis, Data and Decentralization: Measuring Performance of
Legal Institutions in Multilevel Systems of Governance, 102 MINN. L. REV.
1619, 1621 (2018) (discussing the need to measure “the performance of legal
institutions—namely, institutions involved in promulgating and administering norms—within multilevel systems of governance”).
46 See infra Part I.
47 See infra Part II.
48 See infra Part I.
49 See infra Part I.
50 See infra Part II.
51 See infra Part II.
52 See infra Part III.
45
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historical connection between the United Kingdom and several
prominent OFCs.53
Part IV analyzes the cases of Barbados, The Cayman Islands
(Cayman) and Jamaica—British colonies and territories in the
Caribbean—through the state capacity-institutional learning
framework.54 These islands represent a prominent OFC, a reasonably well-developed OFC, and a non-OFC, respectively.55 This
Part suggests that differences in institutional learning during the
colonial period may explain why some OFCs have become more
successful than others, and why a subset of OFCs are capable of
competing with Delaware when it comes to corporate law.56
I.THE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
This Part suggests that the prevailing discourse about the
race for corporate charters (e.g., race to the top, race to the middle,
and race to the bottom) rest on at least four interrelated theories:
network externalities, public choice, institutional isomorphism,
and governance. Section A highlights the scholarly discourse about
how OFCs have become competitors of Delaware in the race for
corporate charters.57 Section B then unpacks the theoretical
frameworks that currently explain OFC competition with Delaware
and highlight their respective weaknesses.58
A. Competing with Delaware
The State of Delaware is often the central actor in the
regulatory competition literature regarding corporate charters.59
This literature theorizes how states attract firms to use their
jurisdiction for incorporation.60 Scholars generally agree that
See, e.g., RONEN PALAN ET AL., TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY
WORKS 124–49 (2010).
54 See infra Part IV.
55 See infra Part IV.
56 See infra Part IV.
57 See infra Section I.A.
58 See infra Section I.B.
59 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 26, at 724.
60 See Romano, supra note 24, at 226; Moon, Delaware’s New Competition,
supra note 1; Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1104 (2015); William Magnuson, The Race to the Middle,
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2020). It bears noting that scholars also
53
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“Delaware’s dominance of corporate law is indisputable, although
the reasons for its appeal are strongly contested.”61 Some commentators have argued that the competition for corporate charters
has produced a race to the top, whereby competition among states
lead to rules that protect shareholders.62 But the longstanding view
by many commentators is that Delaware’s perch in the area of
corporate law is due to the production of predominantly managerfriendly rules.63 This has been referred to as a race to the bottom
and is generally considered harmful to shareholders.64 In essence,
the attempt to attract corporations to their states leads policymakers to adopt lax regulation that insufficiently protects investors.65 More recently, a new narrative proffers that states aim to

discuss regulatory competition in other areas. Id. For example, there is a
literature that addresses regulatory competition and environmental law. See,
e.g., Peter R. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 68 (1996); see also DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (1995).
61 Anderson & Manns, supra note 60, at 1104.
62 See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 60, at 259; see also Ralph K. Winter, The ‘Race
for the Top’ Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526,
1526–29 (1989); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.L. STUD. 251, 257 (1977); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom”
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1211–12 (1992).
63 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435, 1488 (1992).
64 Corporate law scholar William Magnuson artfully explains:
[S]tate legislatures desire to attract corporations to their jurisdictions in order to increase tax revenues, create jobs, and generally improve their economies. But in order to appeal to the
corporations and corporate executives that make decisions about
where to locate business, states must adopt regulations that are
more permissive than the regulations in force in other states. As
each state adopts progressively looser regulations in order to outdo their neighbors, the resulting degradation of standards leads to
suboptimal levels of regulation, whether it be in shareholder
protections, labor laws, tax levels, or environmental standards.
Magnuson, supra note 60, at 1185.
65 Id. It bears noting that Delaware’s development as a leader in corporate
law has also been linked to a few notable institutional and socio-historical
factors. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 29, at 825–26. For example, as it
pertains Delaware’s well-known specialized business courts, corporate law
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avoid extremes (race to the top or race to the bottom)66 when
competing with each other in the corporate charter arena.67 Instead, states aim to copy each other for efficiency reasons and
resist too much difference—in part to avoid the attention of federal regulators.68 It bears acknowledging that some scholars see

experts William Quillen and Michael Hanrahan suggest Delaware’s lack of
an institutionalized court of Chancery, tied to the Crown, during the colonial
period—which was present in other colonies—prevented the development of
“long lasting prejudices against equity and chancery courts.” Id. Further, a
set of “highly qualified nineteenth century chancellors in [the] small conservative state not bothered by urban or agrarian radicalism developed principles and procedures, and practice that enabled the Court to evolve into a
form nationally recognized for resolution of corporate disputes.” Id. at 831.
Additionally, social and physical context mattered in at least two ways. First,
“[t]he egalitarian movement of the 1840s and 1850s never gained momentum
in Delaware where there was strong conservative influence from mercantile
interests.” Id. at 832. Second, “Delaware’s small size enabled equity to be
efficiently administered in a single, centralized chancery court, unlike large
states where it was more practical to administer equity in county courts.” Id.
66 This Article addresses the race to the bottom theory in sentences that
follow. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
67 See Magnuson, supra note 60, at 1186.
68 Id. Competition between states therefore does not lead to divergence in
rules as much as it leads to convergence. Id. According to William Magnuson:
“This dynamic, which may usefully be called the ‘[race to the middle],’ pushes
states toward regulatory schemes that are similar or identical to the schemes
adopted by sufficiently large numbers of other states. The [race to the middle]
encourages states to focus on harmonizing, not differentiating, their regulatory
structures.” Id. But there is a well-developed argument from neo-institutional
theory that convergence in this regard isn’t for purposes of efficiency but
helps to bolster the legitimacy of competitors. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter
W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 147, 147–48 (1983).
The race to the middle theory has several component parts. First, organizations, including states, find it inefficient to reinvent the wheel. See Magnuson, supra note 60, at 1186–87. If a rule in another state works well, states
are inclined to follow that model. Id. Second, network effects are important.
See infra Section II.B. If the pre-existing rule has a strong following among
firms, lawyers, and other actors; it is worthwhile to adopt that rule to lower
learning and other costs. Magnuson, supra note 60, at 1186. Third, an interest in similarity allows for harmonization of rules among states, which can
facilitate cross-border transactions. Id. Finally, as indicated earlier, states
are encouraged to pursue similar rules to avoid standing out to federal policymakers. Id. Difference could prove problematic if it signals to the federal
government that some rule or practice may need to be tamped down or curbed in
some significant way. Id.; see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 591, 597 (2003).
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no significant race for corporate charters because Delaware already
has such a commanding69 lead on would-be state competitors.70
The shared assumption among theories that articulate a
race for corporate charters has largely been that the competitors
are predominantly within the United States—whether states or
the federal government.71 For example, legal scholar William Moon
has noted that “[t]here is virtually no literature on whether and
to what extent foreign nations compete with American states to
supply corporate law.”72 But interest has grown in this area. A
small group of scholars and commentators, including Moon,
have begun to discuss the prospect of OFCs as active competitors for corporate charters.73 Importantly, the contemporary
One could equate Delaware’s lead over competitors to that of world class
sprinter Usain Bolt over rivals. See Doug Mills, 100? 200? Doesn’t Matter. They
Still Can’t Catch Usain Bolt, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/08/19/sports/olympics/usain-bolt-200-meters-results.html [https://
perma.cc/A6JF-Y7DY].
70 See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 26, at 684–85. In this vein, it cannot
be discounted that variables such as state politics and professional talent—
among lawyers and accountants in particular—have contributed to Delaware’s
enduring preeminence. Id. at 694. With the aid of empirical data, Robert
Anderson IV and Jeffrey Manns have argued that Delaware’s continued
prominence is tied to the risk aversion of lawyers and Delaware’s past reputation. Anderson & Manns, supra note 60, at 1090.
71 See Robert Anderson IV, The Delaware Trap: An Empirical Analysis of
Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 659 (2018). This is unsurprising because the scholarship on jurisdictional competition has predominantly
focused on the competition between American states. Id. Perhaps this domestic
focus led to an assumption about a minimum quality of institutions throughout the country. See James E. Alt & David D. Lassen, Political and Judicial
Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments, 20 ECON.
& POL. 33, 56 (2008) (finding that “divided government in American states is
associated with lower corruption”). Consequently, discussing the capabilities
of states where it concerns the passage and implementation of legislation
impacting corporate charters may be seen as unnecessary. See Roe, supra note
68, at 591–92; Romano, supra note 24, at 225; Kahan & Kamar, supra note
26, at 681; Kahan, supra note 24, at 340; Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908,
1909–11 (1998).
72 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1407.
73 See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 3; Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra
note 1, at 1406; DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 14. On the heels of the
Panama Papers debacle, which revealed the financial holdings of prominent
world figures in OFC jurisdictions, Christopher Bruner expertly “re-imagine[d]
offshore finance” and showed how these jurisdictions “have become big players in
cross-border financial services.” BRUNER, supra note 7, at 3; see also Ian
69
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arguments for the relative success of OFCs seem to fold neatly
into those previously made about Delaware’s potential race to the
bottom approach,74 including various related theories that underpin this perspective.75

Bremmer, These 5 Facts Explain the Massive Political Fallout from the Panama Papers, TIME (Apr. 6, 2016, 11:36 AM), https://time.com/4283587/these-5
-facts-explain-the-massive-political-fallout-from-the-panama-papers/ [https://
perma.cc/L2QU-SPVP]. According to Bruner, OFCs are not only attractive to
financiers because of the tax benefits they offer to foreign corporations but
OFCs are also viable alternatives to Delaware due to the regulatory environments they provide. BRUNER, supra note 7, at 10, 47. Anna Manasco Dionne
and Jonathan R. Macey have long proffered that “the modern OFC tends to offer
not only low taxation rates and company registry services, but also regulatory
advantages and financial products competition.” DIONNE & MACEY, supra note
15, at 14. Taking this argument further in a series of insightful articles, William
Moon argues that OFCs are producers of corporate law and are growing rivals to
Delaware. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 3–4; see also
Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1406. Moon draws attention to OFCs as part of “an emerging international market for corporate law.”
Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1403. To support this
argument, Moon notes that, of the growing number of American firms incorporated overseas, approximately a quarter are located in “the Cayman Islands
[‘Cayman’], Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands [‘BVI’].” Id. at 1426. Consistent with Moon’s assessment, political economy scholars posit that “[i]n some
of their earliest forms, tax havens emerged as a reaction more to regulation than
to taxation as such.” Ronen Palan et al., Tax Havens: How Globalization Really
Works, CORNELL STUDIES IN MONEY 109 (Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner
eds., 2010).
74 While scholars and commentators highlight the impact of influential
professionals—primarily powerful lawyers and accountants—and the role of
legislative capture by foreign firms as key explanations for how OFCs compete
with each other, let alone Delaware or other “onshore” jurisdictions, a deeper
analysis is required. See, e.g., Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note
1, at 1426; NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE
DAMAGE OF OFFSHORE BANKING AND TAX HAVENS 105–06 (2011); PALAN ET
AL., supra note 53, at 140. These variables undoubtedly have a role to play in
understanding the operations of OFCs, as they pertain to who has power in
the OFC world and how that power is used. See, e.g., STEVEN LUKES, POWER:
A RADICAL VIEW 1 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the dimensions of power). But
they do not alone offer a comprehensive theory for why OFCs have become
prominent in the competition for corporate charters. See Centeno et al., supra
note 43, at 1. To this end, an OFC’s capabilities—its “state capacity”—is
sorely undertheorized in legal scholarship. See id. at 1, 7 (noting that Max Weber
suggests “the state, and particularly the rule of law, is a façade covering the
reality of relations of power”).
75 See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 10–11 (reflecting on the debate that MDSJs reflect a “race to the bottom”); see also Cary, supra note 2, at 666.
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B. Theorizing Regulatory Competition for Corporate Charters
Subsumed in the legislative capture and good governance
perspectives on regulatory competition are four interrelated theories that help to explain the corporate charter competition and,
ultimately, the rise of OFCs. They are (1) network effects,76 (2)
public choice,77 (3) institutional isomorphism,78 and (4) governance.79 While these theories provide important insights into the
jurisdictional competition for firms, they are limited in their explanatory power.
1. Network Effects
Network effects are considered a main driver in industry
development.80 They allow some places to thrive more than others
from specific types of economic activities.81 According to this theory,
“[c]ertain products become more valuable as their use, or the use
of compatible products, becomes more widespread.”82 The legal
scholarship that incorporates this approach examines the relationship between a critical mass of industry actors (e.g., professionals,
experts, companies, etc.), the viability of an economic activity, and
the choice of legal rules in a jurisdiction.83 For example, scholars
76 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 763, 763–64 (1995); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
424, 424 (1985).
77 William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory:
Bill Cary and the Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447,
452–53 (2000); see Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 45–46;
see also Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1434.
78 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 68, at 149–50.
79 See, e.g., Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1058–59;
see also BRUNER, supra note 7, at 3–4; DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 10–11.
80 Klausner, supra note 76, at 763.
81 Id.; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 76, at 424.
82 Klausner, supra note 76, at 772.
83 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY
L.J. 639, 642 (2014); AnnaLee Saxenian, Inside-Out: Regional Networks and
Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and Route 128, 2 CITYSCAPE, 41, 41
(1996); see also Karen Bradshaw, Stakeholder Dynamics in Development
Projects, 50 J. LEGAL STUD. (accepted following peer review; forthcoming
2021).
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have suggested that popular legal provisions in documents—or legal
rules more generally—can grow in importance, in part, because
they have achieved a certain threshold of prior use.84
In the case of Delaware, Michael Klausner proposes that
the importance of Delaware’s corporate law:
depends in part on interpretive network externalities and legal
services externalities—the present value of future judicial decisions interpreting Delaware law and the net present value
of legal services applying Delaware law. Consequently, as the
number of firms incorporated in a state increases, the value of
its charter increases.85

Given that Delaware has long established a sophisticated
and well-known network of actors (e.g., laws, lawyers, courts, etc.)86
to service the legal needs of firms, other states may find it difficult
to overcome its first-mover advantage.87 According to William
Michael Klausner uses contract language as a prime example:
When the use of a contract term becomes widespread, its value
may rise because of several phenomena. More judicial precedents can be expected, on average, to enhance the clarity of the
term. Common business practices implementing the term may
become established, further reducing uncertainty. Legal advice, opinion letters and related documentation will be more
readily available, more timely, less costly, and more certain.
Finally, firms may find it easier to market their securities.
Klausner, supra note 76, at 761.
85 Id. at 843–44. Klausner suggests that:
A state’s charter is a large package of contract terms, which
includes the state’s substantive and procedural laws, the right
to use the state’s judiciary to resolve disputes, and access to
its bar for legal advice and representation. Just as the value
of a single corporate contract term may include network externalities, so too may the value of a particular state’s charter.
These network externalities parallel those associated with individual corporate contract terms.
Id. at 843.
86 See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Studying Law by Association: Bruno
Latour Goes to the Conseil d’État, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 805, 809 (2008) (discussing how various actors (humans and objects) are connected in the production of law).
87 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 26, at 725–26. But how do networks
develop to the extent that they create positive externalities? The theory of agglomeration economies explains role for geography in the development of industries. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,
99 J. POL. ECON. 483, 483 (1991).
84
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Bratton, “it is not Delaware’s code but its personnel and their
reliable customer service incentives that keep it ahead and deter
market entry by a competing state. A potential competitor would
have to create courts of experts as knowledgeable as Delaware’s
existing bench.”88 According to one view, “Delaware’s appeal is
driven by lawyers’ default decision making based on Delaware’s
past preeminence and reflects lawyers’ failure to assess the value
added by Delaware compared to other states.”89
Network effects are also present in OFCs.90 Moon has identified the interaction between lawyers (e.g., the “offshore magic
circle”91 law firms), corporations, “specialized business courts,”
and “corporate governance rules” as one reason for the rise of an
“international market for corporate law”—with OFCs being important service providers.92 Arguably, much like Delaware,93 the
institutional environment created by the various actors involved
in the OFC may serve to make some OFCs more attractive destinations for finance.94 Investors may choose Jurisdiction A over
See Bratton, supra note 77, at 469–70; Klausner, supra note 76, at 845.
Anderson & Manns, supra note 60, at 1052. The scholars note that “[l]awyers
appear generally to follow a ‘herd mentality’ in which Delaware serves as both
the clear default (that lawyers and/or clients assume adds value) and the ‘safe
choice,’ which constitutes the path of least resistance and effort.” Id. at 1088.
In a subsequent article, Anderson further suggests there is “a clear relationship
between the sophistication of a company’s legal representation and the jurisdictional choice decision.” Anderson, supra note 71, at 694 (noting that “more
sophisticated lawyers choose Delaware incorporation for their clients[,] and less
sophisticated lawyers choose local (home state) incorporation for their clients”).
On the one hand, sophisticated firms are more inclined to encourage their
clients to incorporate in Delaware. Id. at 710. On the other hand, less sophisticated firms (which are smaller in terms of geographic scope of their practice) are more likely to steer clients toward home state incorporation. Id. That
said, some scholars suggest that the federal government may be Delaware’s
top competitor because the federal government also regulates corporations. See
Roe, supra note 68, at 600.
90 Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 48.
91 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1434.
92 Id. at 1403.
93 Klausner, supra note 76, at 843–44.
94 Brett McDonnell artfully explains:
States which derive strong benefits from having many businesses incorporated there may become committed to keeping
the law favorable to corporate decision makers. More corporate
cases may lead to a more experienced and expert judiciary.
88
89
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Jurisdiction B because of the network that exists in Jurisdiction
A and prior familiarity with this network, not exclusively because of
the quality of Jurisdiction A’s laws.95
But while network effects can play a pivotal role in jurisdictions’ attractiveness to firms, their explanatory power is limited without an in-depth, comparative historical explanation for
why key networks developed in a particular location and not in
others.96 This type of explanation is particularly important in
the case of small OFCs.97 In these cases, one can find multiple
island nations—similarly situated in geography and economic
size—actively vying to be tax and corporate law havens.98 How
and why networks develop more robustly in some over others
bears careful economic, social, and historical explanations.99
2. Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory provides another potential explanation—at least with respect to the race to the bottom perspective—
for Delaware’s success, as well as the success of some OFCs.100
While admittedly broad and multifaceted,101 the public choice
literature neatly connects the role of legislative capture to industry
growth.102 Going a step further from network effects, scholars
suggest that some special interests can effectively organize to

Corporate lawyers and service companies know more about the
leading states than other states. All of these gains from having many corporations incorporated in a state, in turn, make
that state more favorable to future new incorporations or reincorporations.
Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 681, 685 (2003).
95 See Anderson & Manns, supra note 60, at 1051–54.
96 BRUNER, supra note 7, at 200–01.
97 Id. at 192.
98 See id. at 191–220.
99 See infra Part II.
100 See Bratton, supra note 77, at 461.
101 See Daniel Farber, Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: VOLUME I: METHODOLOGY AND
CONCEPTS 181, 447–48 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
102 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1431–32.
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promote their cause with policymakers.103 This is because of the
smallness of their group, their political or economic influence, or
a combination of these. 104
If one takes a public choice perspective, it may seem unsurprising that Delaware’s legislation may appear friendly to
managers.105 In 1974, William L. Cary argued that Delaware had
become subservient to the needs of corporate interest.106 More
recently, Bratton noted that for a jurisdiction like Delaware to be
competitive, it has to limit the likelihood of exit by business “by
making a credible commitment to remain constant to its customer
firms’ interests.”107 But Cary worried that the revenue benefits derived from incorporations may cause the legislative and judicial
branches of government “to lack the neutrality and detachment”
necessary to address the needs of shareholders.108 This further
caused Cary to ponder the wisdom of allowing Delaware “to grant
management unilateral control untrammeled by other interest.”109
According to one perspective in the political economy literature, a strong state (or jurisdiction) acts in the larger public
interest without succumbing to the pressures from interest
103 Lina Eriksson explains that “a central problem for public choice theorists is the capture of the political and bureaucratic process by self-interested
politicians, bureaucrats and special interest groups, that is the biasing of policy
outcomes in favor of some interests over those of the general public.” Lina
Eriksson, Public Choice Theory, in HANDBOOK ON THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE
322 (Christopher Ansell & Jacob Torfing eds., 2016).
Consider the case of corporate criminal legislation. Vikramaditya Khanna
has argued that, in times of prominent corporate malfeasance, corporate
interests may actively lobby for specific kinds of corporate crime legislation
that levy low costs on actors—thereby allowing for their continued prosperity.
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 95, 98 (2004). The main aim of these actors is to
“[avoid] legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to their interests and sometimes deflect ... criminal liability away from managers and
executives and onto corporations.” Id.
104 See id. at 1433.
105 Thomas, Institutions, supra note 35, at 981. Chantal Thomas juxtaposed the idea of a benign welfare state with public choice theory. Id. The
latter views “decisions by political institutions as merely the aggregate of individual self-interested choices ... subject to a variety of flaws.” Id.
106 Cary, supra note 2, at 663.
107 Bratton, supra note 77, at 448.
108 Id. at 663.
109 Id.
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groups.110 OFCs are hardly referred to as strong jurisdictions in
this regard in the literature.111 Indeed, two interrelated features
of OFC operations have been used to explain their rise: sophisticated transnational corporate lawyers and legislative capture by
corporations (and their lawyers).112
First, with respect to legal professionals, some scholars
point to the “emergence of ‘offshore magic circle’113 law firms that
purport to provide full-service law practice ranging from offshore
mergers and acquisitions to offshore fund formations.”114 One
theory is that the norms about how offshore investments operate
have traveled with these actors from one jurisdiction to another—
perhaps leading to efficiencies and best practices along the way.115
Second, it has been argued that well-organized and influential groups of lawyers who represent corporate interests have
also managed to capture the legislatures in OFCs.116 These legislatures in turn make laws that are beneficial to their corporate
It bears noting that “the idea of the ‘weak’ state buffeted by pressures
from interest groups, which is a staple of public choice theory and the literature on ‘rent seeking’ by lobbying groups, has family resemblance to the older
Marxist theory of the state on the end of the political spectrum.” Pranab
Bardhan, State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current
Literature, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 862, 868 (2016). The strong state, on the contrary,
“acts neither at the behest of, nor on behalf of, the dominant classes.” Id. at
869. This type of state is capable of deciding when it is in the country’s best
interest to conform to select interest group pressures—such as when it has
long term economic growth benefits for the population—and when it is useful
to chart an entirely new course. Id. at 867.
111 See, e.g., Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1406;
SHAXSON, supra note 74, at 87, 88, 92.
112 Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 3.
113 This is “a colloquial term given to law firms that have established physical offices in strategic offshore jurisdictions like Jersey, Bermuda, the British
Virgin Islands, Hong Kong and the Seychelles.” Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1434.
114 Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 3.
115 See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM
LATIN AMERICAN STATES 5 (2002) (discussing how “law ... reproduce[s] the
field of power” in several Latin American countries); see also DiMaggio & Powell,
supra note 68, at 152–54 (discussing how social pressures from professionals
can influence organizational change—not the pursuit of efficiencies).
116 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1429–37.
110

212 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:189
“customers.”117 As a consequence, American corporations are
glad to evade domestic regulations by incorporating in an OFC
and using the jurisdiction’s corporate governance laws to regulate their internal affairs.118 In short, “offshore financial havens
are often straightforward cases of legislative capture, whereby laws
can literally be written by interested private actors.”119
Pursuant to this thesis, OFCs offer a permissive regulatory
regime merely clothed in the appearance of legal formalities.120
But a focus on the legislative capture of OFCs as the key explanatory variable for their success overlooks the possibility that
the activities of special interest in OFCs—including local constituents—may offset those of special interests in “onshore jurisdictions,” such as the United States.121 For example, corporate law
experts Anna Manasco Dionne and Jonathan Macey suggest
that “[o]ffshore competition is particularly threatening for entrenched local interests because of the inability of onshore interest groups to influence offshore regulators. Indeed, the relative
isolation of offshore regulators from onshore interest groups is
likely one of the primary reasons for their success.”122
Id.
Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 7–10.
119 Id. at 6–7.
120 Moon focuses on Cayman, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”)
in his article. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1406. In
addition to Bermuda, Bruner highlights the performance of Dubai, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and Switzerland. BRUNER, supra note 7, at 11.
121 See generally Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1 (examining
how offshore jurisdictions compete with U.S. jurisdictions, specifically Delaware).
122 Id. at 1432–37. According to Moon, OFCs are faced with immense pressures from special interests to legislate for their benefit. See id. (explaining
how lawyers and other private-sector actors influence corporate law in OFCs).
In this regard, the “motives of offshore corporate law havens (OFCs) are not
too different from those of Delaware.” Id. at 1431–32. There is a form of quid pro
quo—i.e., favorable legislation in return for revenue. See id. at 1432. Moon
notes that OFCs “rely on the profits from recurring franchise and incorporation fees received from locally registered business entities.” Id. Even more
directly, Moon argues:
To focus exclusively on government coffers to explain the behavior of legislators would neglect another pivotal aspect of
[the] corporate lawmaking process—the various interest groups,
including lawyers, accountants, and other stakeholders who
stand to benefit from attracting foreign corporations, that also
117
118
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But, while the legislative capture thesis is compelling, there
is reason to suspect that not all of these jurisdictions are equally
subject to the influence of special interests.123 If these jurisdictions
were all subject to capture by the same or similar set of external
actors, we would likely see more uniformity in legal structures and
less specialization among OFCs than currently exist.124 Consequently, a well-developed theory of capture across OFCs is required.
This theory would explain variation in the degree of capture
among these jurisdictions, which would include a role for interest
groups from within OFCs (i.e., domestic actors) on the sector’s
institutional development and trajectory.125
3. Institutional Isomorphism
If legislative capture alone does not explain legal change in
OFCs, perhaps lessons about how states behave can be learned
from scholars of organizations. States must decide whether to
resist conformity and stand out in their policy choices or follow
the lead of other states and move toward the standardization or
harmonization of rules as suggested by the race to the middle
theory.126 In this regard, Magnuson accepts that “the race to the

drive the corporate lawmaking process in offshore corporate
law havens, just as they do in the domestic context.
Id. at 1432.
123 See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 8 (identifying legislative autonomy—albeit,
without a discussion of interest groups—as a feature of “market-dominant
small jurisdictions”).
124 See id. (focusing argument on the differences between offshore jurisdictions). For example, Bermuda is known for its reinsurance market and Cayman
has garnered a reputation as being “the largest holder of US Securities in the
world. Hedge funds are the main factor for this strong Cayman-US link.” Jan
Fichtner, The Anatomy of the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Center:
Anglo-America, Japan, and the Role of Hedge Funds, 23 REV. INT’L POL.
ECON. 1034, 1034 (2016); see also Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra
note 5, at 13–16; BRUNER, supra note 7, at 59–67.
125 But see Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morriss, Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial Center: Structure & Strategy Since 1960, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1297, 1299–300 (2013) (describing the actors and institutions that made Cayman
a successful OFC). If there is significant divergence among OFCs in the type
of interest groups that seek to exert influence on their development, this
could explain differences in their success and viability. See id.
126 See Magnuson, supra note 60, at 1186 (describing “race to the middle”
theory).
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middle may allow suboptimal, but widely adopted, regulatory
schemes to crowd out more efficient, but sparsely adopted, ones.”127
Implicit in this perspective is the long-accepted organizational
theory of institutional isomorphism.128 According to scholars Paul
DiMaggio and Walter Powell, while there is an efficiency argument
for adopting pre-existing and well-developed rules, conformity—or
institutional isomorphism—is often motivated by other reasons.129
Institutional isomorphism explains how institutions, including
legal institutions, can become more homogenous due to social
processes and forces that make them “more similar without necessarily making them more efficient.”130
Pursuant to the institutional isomorphism theory, three
social forces tend to impact decisions around institutional choice.131
First, there is the human and group desire to be seen as legitimate as compared to peers, which is referred to as mimetic isomorphism.132 This may be the case of poorer jurisdictions modeling
the institutions of wealthier nations or ex-colonies modeling the
governance strategies of former empires.133
Second, the influence of professionals (e.g., lawyers or accountants), who have specific training and ideals regarding how
a type of business activity should be undertaken, can be imparted
across different environments.134 This has been conceptualized
as normative isomorphism.135 For example, American business
lawyers may take their legal training and American approach to
transactional lawyering to a number of foreign countries and
present these features of law practice as the normatively better
approach.136 In addition, these professionals often move from one
organization or jurisdiction to another, thereby sharing their
Id. at 1186.
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 68, at 149–50 (describing three
“mechanisms” of institutional isomorphism in detail).
129 See id. at 153.
130 Id. at 147.
131 Id. at 151.
132 Id. at 151–52.
133 See, e.g., Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families
and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1816.
134 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 68, at 152.
135 Id.
136 Carol V. Rose, The “New” Law and Development Movement in Post–
Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 L. & SOC. REV. 93, 121–22 (1999).
127
128
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knowledge and promoting some degree of uniformity or harmonization in policies and legislation.137
Third, in some instances, there is a power dimension to
institutional isomorphism.138 This has been termed coercive isomorphism.139 Here, “formal and informal pressures” are brought
to bear on organizations from external actors upon which they
depend, as well as “by cultural expectations in the society within
which [the] organizations function.”140 For example, international
organizations and wealthy nations may seek to influence the policy
choices and legal reform strategies of developing countries by
threatening to withhold foreign aid.141
The institutional isomorphism thesis explains why OFCs
may have strong institutional similarities, including their tax and
corporate legal structures.142 But it does not explain how differences occur.143 Given the social pressures to conform, it does not
articulate an explanation for why some OFCs stake out their own
areas of specialization and prominence.144 For example, Cayman
is known as the destination for hedge funds and Bermuda is well
known for insurance captives.145
4. Governance
One of the more compelling theories for why some countries are better able than others to achieve economic growth relates to the quality of their governance.146 International tax scholars
have suggested that the quality of governance in a country also
directly impacts whether that country will become a tax haven (or
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 68, at 152–53.
Id. at 150–51.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 150.
141 See John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM.
J. SOC. 144, 167–68 (1997); see also Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking
the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 1095, 1114 (2007) (discussing how legal indicators, such as the World
Bank’s Doing Business indicators, can be used as benchmarks for foreign aid).
142 DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 68, at 147.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See Fichtner, supra note 124, at 1051; Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance,
supra note 5, at 13–16; BRUNER, supra note 7, at 59–67.
146 Francis Fukuyama, What Is Governance?, 26 GOVERNANCE 347, 360 (2013)
[hereinafter Fukuyama, What Is Governance?].
137
138
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OFC).147 In an analysis of over 200 countries, Dhammika Dharmapala and James Hines, Jr. show that well-governed countries
are more likely than poorly governed countries to find success in
the offshore finance world.148 These scholars convincingly show
that OFCs “score very well on cross-country indices of governance quality that include measures of voice and accountability,
political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and the
control of corruption.”149 Importantly, they argue that “causality
runs from governance quality to tax haven status.”150 Dharmapala
and Hines further suggest that “there are almost no poorly governed tax havens [OFCs].”151 This makes sense if we accept that
some of the key selling features of OFCs are the transparency and
stability of their government,152 as well as the high quality and
sophistication of their legal regimes.153
Investors arguably pick some OFCs because of their confidence in the legal and political institutions they provide.154 But,
despite frequent media and academic references to tax evasion and
corruption in OFCs,155 scholars have found that these jurisdictions
tend to demonstrate strong fidelity to the rule of law and regulatory effectiveness.156 To this point, it has become largely accepted
Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1058–59.
Id.
149 Id. at 1058 (emphasis added). Dharmapala and Hines used the governance index from Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters IV: Governance
Indicators for 1996–2004, 60 (World Bank Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No.
3630, 2005).
150 Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines, Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ Rsch. Working Paper No. 12802,
2006) [hereinafter Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries Working Paper].
151 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1058.
152 Id. at 1059. Dharmapala and Hines show that “causality runs from governance quality to tax haven status.” Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries
Working Paper, supra note 150, at 2. In other words, becoming a tax haven or
OFC does not improve the quality of governance of a country. Id.
153 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1407; Morriss
& Henson, supra note 15, at 448.
154 For example, in discussing the value of money, anthropologist David
Graeber observes that “the value of a unit of currency is not the measure of
its value of an object, but the measure of one’s trust in other human beings.”
DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 47 (2014).
155 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 102–46
(Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010) [hereinafter Morriss, Regulatory Competition].
156 See Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1058–59.
147
148
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that, beyond the promise of low taxes, OFCs can only attract
multinational corporations and wealthy individuals to their shores
by promising a high quality legal environment.157
Of course, not all OFCs reflect the same degree of good
governance or are equally successful.158 Dharmapala and Hines
distinguish between those countries that are focused on the substance of international finance versus those that, in their attempt to
be tax havens, are involved in nefarious activities—and are consequently less reputable.159 Specifically, the scholars explain:
A view that is frequently expressed in both scholarly and popular
writings is that tax havens are ‘outlaw’ countries that disregard
international norms. The results in [the study] may appear surprising from this perspective. It should be noted that there is
some degree of overlap between the set of tax haven countries and
those countries alleged by the OECD to facilitate money laundering activity, and with those countries that provide ‘flags of convenience’ for international shipping ... ‘Pure’ tax havens (i.e., those
tax havens that are not also alleged by the OECD to facilitate
money laundering or identified as providing ‘flags of convenience’) are even better-governed than tax havens as a group.
Consequently, restricting attention to those ‘pure’ havens
would only strengthen the association between tax haven status and good governance.160

In a tribute to the importance of good governance in more
successful and reputable jurisdictions, Andrew Morriss and
Clifford Henderson suggest that OFCs have a strong “incentive
to effectively regulate to protect the integrity of their ‘brands’ in
the financial market by controlling money laundering and other
criminal activities.”161 These scholars propose that “[w]hen the
differences in financial sectors, government structures, and other
See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 21; Moon, Delaware’s New Competition,
supra note 1, at 1407; DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 12. Andrew Morriss
argues that “[g]overnments can provide legal environments that facilitate
economic activity by promoting contract enforcement, secure property rights,
honest and efficient courts, registries for forms of property from land to security interests, and other services.” Morriss, Regulatory Competition, supra note
155, at 122.
158 See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 191–220 (discussing failed OFCs: what
Bruner terms Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions (MDSJs)).
159 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1061.
160 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries Working Paper, supra note 150,
at 12–13.
161 Morriss & Henson, supra note 15, at 434.
157
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factors are considered, mature OFCs are at least as likely to be
exerting more regulatory effort than their onshore competitors as
they are to be exerting less.”162 According to Dionne and Macey,
OFC optimists may argue that “some OFCs are at least as well
regulated as, if not better regulated than, prominent onshore
markets such as in the United States and the United Kingdom,
particularly following a recent international effort to improve
transparency and combat money laundering.”163 But the desire
to protect their brand and provide certainty to investors is not
enough to ensure good governance since this desire may be necessary but not sufficient for effective regulation.164
Even the most ambitious developing country in search of
growth may find it difficult to become a successful OFC if it is
poorly governed.165 Investors would be too insecure to invest their
assets in this type of jurisdiction, tax benefits notwithstanding.166
But how is good governance assessed in this context? Dharmapala
and Hines assess high quality governance by using specific indicators, including cross-national measures of the rule of law.167
Id. at 454.
Dionne and Macey argue that:
OFCs provide legitimate alternative markets for law-abiding
individuals and corporations and protect corporations’ ability
to take risks in an increasingly global economy. OFCs are also
said to have more generalized benefits for onshore governments, particularly to the extent they give companies access
to tax-free or low tax capital, improving the free flow of capital and contributing to onshore markets.
DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 12.
164 See, e.g., Miguel Centeno & Alejandro Portes, The Informal Economy in
the Shadow of the State, in OUT OF THE SHADOWS: POLITICAL ACTION AND THE
INFORMAL ECONOMY IN LATIN AMERICA 28 (Patricia Fernandez-Kelly & Jon
Shefner eds., 2006) (“[A] weak state may assign itself a large ‘load’ of regulatory measures over civil society .... These states may be described as ‘frustrated’
because of the permanent contradiction between the voluminous paper regulations that they spawn and their inability to enforce them in practice.”).
165 See Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1058
(noting that tax havens tend to be well-governed).
166 See DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 12.
167 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1060. The
concern here is that references to governance, even when founded on indicators, remain void of actionable steps that can be taken to enhance regulatory
competition. See Kevin E. Davis, Legal Indicators: The Power of Quantitative
Measures of Law, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 37, 47 (2014) [hereinafter Davis,
Legal Indicators].
162
163
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Indicators—like the World Governance Indicators upon which
Dharmapala and Hines rely—are innately imprecise as to the
phenomena they seek to measure.168
As much as indicators objectively attempt to assess the
quality of governance in a country, these technologies inevitably
reflect standards that are influenced by their creator’s method of
analysis, ideology and even cultural norms.169 Further, it is unclear what high scores on sub-indicators of governance—like the
rule of law, freedom of speech, accountability, political stability,
low corruption, and government effectiveness—actually mean for
the day-to-day running of government.170 Indeed, Dharmapala
and Hines accept that “the evidence that [OFCs]171 are bettergoverned than comparable [non-havens] does not identify the
mechanism through which governance [might influence] the
propensity to become a [OFC].”172
Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1064; see Davis,
Legal Indicators, supra note 167, at 44–45.
169 Kevin Davis et al., Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46
L. & SOC’Y REV. 71, 78 (2012).
170 See World Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, https://info.worldbank
.org/governance/wgi/ [https://perma.cc/DRH5-J8AZ].
171 Dharmapala and Hines use the term “tax haven.” Dharmapala & Hines,
Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1064.
172 Id. Arguably, Christopher Bruner’s description of successful MDSJs
provides an ideal type for what governance means in practice. BRUNER, supra
note 7, at 41–43. Bruner describes an “ideal type” as providing “an empirically
grounded ‘terminology’ permitting one to speak more coherently about a
given social phenomenon.” Id. at 42–43. Bruner highlights five features that
tend to stand out among successful OFCs. Id. at 42. First, they tend to be “small
and poorly endowed with natural resources, limiting their economicdevelopment options.” Id. at 43. Second, they are capable of passing legislation
within their jurisdiction—a feature Bruner refers to as “legislative autonomy.”
Id. at 44–45. Third, they are geographically and culturally linked to several
wealthier countries. Id. at 45. Fourth, they “heavily invest in human capital,
professional networks, and related institutional structures.” Id. at 46. Finally,
they “consciously balance close collaboration with and robust oversight of the
financial professional community, seeking at once to convey flexibility, stability,
and credibility.” Id. Reflecting on the underlying theories regarding Delaware’s
success—outlined in Part I—it would appear that factors such as network externalities, the ability to manage interest groups, and the approach to institutional isomorphism remain relevant. See supra Sections I.B.1–3. But, even
if we accept that better governed small jurisdictions that feature Bruner’s five
factors are likely to achieve success in the OFC arena, we are still left to
168



220 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:189
References to governance outcomes do not tell us how jurisdictions ensure that the relevant actors within their borders work
together harmoniously to promote successful offshore financial
services.173 According to economist Pranab Bardhan, “[b]eyond
being a ‘nightwatchman’ of property rights and markets, the state
often needs to be a guide, coordinator, stimulator, and a catalytic
agent for economic activities in situations where, for various historical and structural reasons, the development process has been
atrophied.”174 Consequently, when contemplating an explanation
for why some countries are better positioned to become OFCs
and to be successful in this arena, this Article suggests it is
worth considering a role for state capacity as an important explanatory factor.175
II.STATE CAPACITY
This Part introduces the concept of state capacity and
suggests that the corporate charter race depends on a jurisdiction’s ability to strategically coordinate and engage aspects of
network effects, collective action problems, and institutional isomorphism. It suggests that state capacity may be the genesis or
underpinning of good governance.
A. Conceptualizing State Capacity
Scholars of development proffer that a state’s capabilities
or “capacity” is directly related to its developmental success.176

wonder how exactly they are able to achieve this feat, and why others that are
similarly situated cannot. See infra Section III.C.
173 See infra Section II.A.
174 Bardhan, supra note 110, at 864.
175 See infra Section II.A.
176 See, e.g., Elaine Enriquez & Miguel Centeno, State Capacity: Utilization,
Durability, and the Role of Wealth vs. History, 1 INT’L & MULTIDISCIPLINARY
J. SOC. SCI. 130, 132 (2012) (discussing the role of states in development);
PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 10, 22 (1995).
Ruchir Sharma, Chief Global Strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment
Management, touched on the concept in his book “The 10 Rules of Successful
Nations”—although it is referred to as “state power.” RUCHIR SHARMA, THE 10
RULES OF SUCCESSFUL NATIONS 65–83 (2020). In considering the role of states
in a country’s economic development, the author notes that: “Successful nations don’t have small governments; they have the right-sized government for
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Consequently, social scientists have used a range of variables to
indicate a state’s capacity in their empirical analyses.177 For example, scholars have defined state capacity as one of or a combination
of the following: country wealth (i.e., economic strength), military
power, the physical reach of the government throughout a territory, and the government’s bureaucratic capabilities.178 Needless to
say, a number of these variables are interrelated and correlated.179
However, the differing perspectives stem from the diverse disciplinary approaches used to study the concept.180 For example,
economists are often, though not exclusively, concerned with country wealth and how states facilitate economic growth.181 Political
scientists often contemplate how states make and implement
policy choices.182 Sociologists have taken to studying the bureaucratic strength of states.183 Despite the divergence in strategy,
each of these disciplines has revealed that a state’s capacity for

their stage of development.” Id. at 65. In light of the ambiguity regarding the
nature of this type of government, Sharma clarifies that: “The state needs to be
large enough to maintain conditions essential to civilized commerce, including
basic infrastructure and mechanisms to contain corruption, monopolies and
crime.” Id. at 71.
177 See Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 134–35.
178 See, e.g., id. at 134–36; Hillel Soifer & Matthias vom Hau, Unpacking the
Strength of the State Infrastructural Power, 43 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 219,
220–21 (2008).
179 See Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 142–43.
180 See, e.g., id. at 134 (discussing the various ways scholars understand “state
capacity”); see also Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285, 286 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic
Consequences]; Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 897–99; DARON ACEMOGLU
ET AL., A REVIEW OF DOING BUSINESS (2013) [hereinafter DARON ACEMOGLU
ET AL., A REVIEW]; Timothy Besley, Law, Regulation, and the Business Climate: The Nature and Influence of the World Bank Doing Business Project, 29
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 99, 101 (2015).
181 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2364, 2364–66 (2015); Timothy
Besley & Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights,
Taxation, and Politics, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1218, 1219 (2009).
182 See, e.g., Soifer & vom Hau, supra note 178, at 220; Michael Mann, The
Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Result, 25 EUR.
J. SOC. 185, 185, 189 (1984).
183 See, e.g., Peter Evans & James Rauch, Bureaucracy and Growth: A
Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of The “Weberian” State Structures on
Economic Growth, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 748, 748 (1999).

222 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:189
development is contextual.184 For example, a given state may be
extremely capable of activity A but not activity B.185
Some political sociologists propose that state capacity enables the bureaucratic arm of government to effectively accomplish chosen policy goals.186 In this vein, state capacity speaks to
the capabilities that allow governments to pursue and implement a
chosen agenda designed by a well-organized, talented, and experienced group of experts from within, rather than rely on external
(i.e., non-governmental) sources for advice and guidance.187 Arguably, this type of internal expertise helps the government withstand the pressures from special interest groups.188 While there
is an economic component to creating this type of bureaucracy,
since experts must be adequately compensated, there are other
aspects as well.189 One view is that these countries may find it

See, e.g., Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 156.
See, e.g., Elaine Enriquez et al., A Cross-National Comparison of SubNational Variation, 61 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 908, 928 (2017) (discussing the contextual nature of “state capacity”).
186 Centeno et al., supra note 43, at 3–25. There is an implicit recognition
that not all policy goals are achievable, particularly within a short time frame.
Id. at 3. There is also the reality that it is infeasible to tackle too many goals
simultaneously. Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 141–42; see Evans &
Rauch, supra note 183, at 760.
187 See Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and Economic
Intervention in the Early New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 260–61 (1982).
188 Id. at 276–77. During Donald Trump’s administration, the kind of bureaucratic depth and expertise often referred to by political sociologists has
been referred to pejoratively as the “deep state.” But, scholars, such as Jon
Michaels, have argued that:
[T]he American bureaucracy is very much a demotic institution, demographically diverse, highly accountable, and lacking
financial incentives or caste proclivities to subvert popular will;
that demotic bureaucratic depth of the American variety should
be celebrated, not feared; and that, going forward, we need
greater, not lesser, depth insofar as the American bureaucracy serves an important, salutary, and quite possibly necessary
role in safeguarding our constitutional commitments and enriching our public policies.
Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653,
1655 (2018).
189 See Evans & Rauch, supra note 183, at 760.
184
185
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economically beneficial to invest in high quality bureaucracies as
a way to spark growth.190
Sociologists Peter Evans and James Rauch have empirically shown that specific characteristics of government agencies
are helpful for economic growth.191 These scholars empirically
demonstrate that “variations in the form of state organization
might affect economic dynamism.”192 Features like “meritocratic
recruitment” and “predictable career ladders” aid in “structur[ing]
the incentives of individual bureaucrats in a way that enhances
the ability of the organizations they manage to effectively pursue
long-term goals.”193 “Meritocratic recruitment” speaks to a form of
government employment based on education and other objective
measures of professional qualification.194 A “predictable career
According to Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock:
[W]ealth need not be a pre-requisite to institutional quality
[because] high quality institutions may not actually be very
expensive .... The principal costs associated with operating legal institutions are the costs of personnel. However, personnel
costs tend to be determined principally by the supply of workers
with relevant skills rather than simply by national wealth. Some
countries that are poor in the sense of having low levels of national income and/or limited endowments of natural resources
nevertheless have relatively low-paid but well-educated populations. In those countries, the cost of maintaining high quality
legal institutions may not be prohibitive. Moreover, in some cases
the quality of institutions is manifested in their ability to limit
rather than expand the role of the state.
Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 922.
191 Evans & Rauch, supra note 183, at 760. This suggests that the cost of a
high-quality bureaucracy may be a small price to pay for the economic upside.
See id. at 752; Alejandro Portes & Lori D. Smith, Conclusion: The Comparative Analysis of the Role of Institutions in National Development, in
INSTITUTIONS COUNT: THEIR ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE IN LATIN AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT 187 (Alejandro Portes & Lori D. Smith eds., 2012).
192 Evans & Rauch, supra note 183, at 750. Evans and Rauch construct
their thesis and research around Max Weber’s theory on bureaucracies. Id. at
748. According to these scholars, “[t]he Weberian perspective does not negate
the positive effects of strengthening market institutions, but it does postulate
that bureaucratically structured public organizations, using their own distinct
set of decision-making procedures, are a necessary complement to market-based
institutional arrangements.” Id. at 749.
193 Id. at 752.
194 Id. at 751.
190
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ladder” refers to the provision of suitable, practical, and reliable
incentives over the course of a career in government service—as
a way to retain and promote skilled employees.195
Evans and Rauch found that states with a bureaucracy
that scored high on these features tended to have better economic
performance—even when accounting for initial wealth.196 Going
further, scholars have suggested that some agencies within the
government bureaucracy may be more important to economic
growth than others.197 These are “mostly economic agencies.”198
But, perhaps the key benefit to having a competent bureaucracy
is that it can effectively assist with “coordination problems that
may be crucial in instigating new activities.”199
This ability—to skillfully and seamlessly identify and coordinate relevant actors and regulations—may separate some
aspiring OFC jurisdictions from more prominent and established
ones.200 Specifically, stronger OFCs may have the facility to
build on network externalities, the autonomy to incorporate the
best ideas from special interests while reducing the likelihood or
the extent of being captured, and the sophistication to know when
to adopt another country’s rules and when to chart a new course.201
This may amount to what Dharmapala and Hines refer to as
good “governance.”202
B. State Capacity and Policy Implementation
The combination of expertise nurtured over time, a set of
well-crafted and tested ideas by seasoned professionals, and the
ability to effectively coordinate a range of actors are critical aspects
of a state’s capacity.203 Consequently, high quality government
Id.
Id. at 748.
197 See Portes & Smith, supra note 191, at 178.
198 Id. at 176–78 (noting that institutions “whose prime mission is economic,”
such as the “stock exchange and the tax authority” may prove especially important to development).
199 Evans & Rauch, supra note 183, at 753.
200 See Peter Evans et al., The Political Foundations of State Effectiveness,
in STATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 387 (Miguel Centeno et al. eds., 2017).
201 See infra Section III.C.
202 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1058.
203 Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 187, at 260–61.
195
196
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bureaucracies are crucial to policy implementation.204 The cumulative years of experience and institutional knowledge of internal
experts can guide policymakers away from potential implementation dead-ends, as well as leverage previously gathered data
and analysis.205 In this regard, “state strength [is conceived as]
autonomy from civil society and its power holders.”206 This view
of state capacity207 may be articulated as the counterweight to the
legislative capture perspective, whereby powerful interests lay hold
on the state apparatus and use it for their own personal gain.208
An example of the role of bureaucratic quality for policy implementation comes from a form of natural experiment in American
history.209 Political scientists Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold
studied the relative success of two legislative acts signed into law
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression.210 These were the Agricultural Adjustment Act (Adjustment
Evans et al., supra note 200, at 387.
Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 187, at 260–61.
206 Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 135.
207 Skocpol and Finegold proffer “[g]overnments that have, or can quickly
assemble, their own knowledgeable administrative organizations are better able
to carry through interventionist policies than are government that must rely
on extragovernmental experts and organizations.” Skocpol & Finegold, supra
note 187, at 260–61.
208 See, e.g., Bertrall R. Ross, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565,
1609 (2013). On the contrary, poor quality bureaucratic arrangements can prove
constraining on a country’s economy. Evans & Rauch, supra note 183, at 749,
751. According to political economy scholars:
The insights of earlier work on bureaucratic coherence and capacity, which were a cornerstone of the analysis of the role of the
state in promoting industrial growth, remain basic. The widespread provision of complex collective goods that have positive
network externalities requires competent civil servants coherently
organized on a very large scale. Meritocratic recruitment, career paths with overall rewards roughly on par with privatesector alternatives, and esprit de corps sufficient to valorize the
accomplishment of shared projects are even more important
when development is focused on capability expansion than they
were in earlier models in which the state, while crucial, was
essentially an auxiliary to private capital.
Evans et al., supra note 200, at 307.
209 See, e.g., NATURAL EXPERIMENTS OF HISTORY 8 (Jared Diamond & James
A. Robinson eds., 2011).
210 Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 187, at 255.
204
205
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Act) and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) (together
with the Adjustment Act, the “Acts”).211 Both Acts were adopted in
early 1933 and aimed to create “authoritative new administrative
organizations—the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA)—through which
economic functions formerly shaped by market competition would
be planned and regulated in the public interest.”212 Notwithstanding their similar ends, the Acts had “sharply contrasting trajectories of development.”213 The Adjustment Act found success, and
the NIRA eventually collapsed.214
In terms of goals, NIRA sought to enable the private sector
to make a “reasonable profit” while ensuring that labor receives
“living wages.”215 The Adjustment Act aimed to increase the price
of “agricultural commodities.”216 It sought to “promote[ ] a redistribution of income to farmers who were struggling financially from
low prices and continual domestic surpluses in major agricultural
commodities.”217 Skocpol and Finegold suggest that the reason for
211 Id. According to Skocpol and Finegold, “[b]oth the [NIRA] and the [AAA]
were passed by Congress in the spring of 1933, during the heady ‘Hundred Days’
of intense legislative activity that followed [Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s] inauguration amidst the depths of the depression.” Id.
212 Id. at 256.
213 Id. at 257.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 256. Jason E. Taylor explains:
The NIRA required firms in the manufacturing sector to join with
their competitors in drawing up industry-level “codes of fair competition.” Compliance with these cartel codes, the contents of
which were public record, was mandatory, and violations could be
punished through government fines and imprisonment, although
they rarely were .... The NIRA was designed as a quid pro quo—
in exchange for granting wage and hour alternations favorable
to its employees, businesses were allowed to engage in collusive behavior.
Jason E. Taylor, Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel Performance: An IndustryLevel Analysis of the National Industry Recovery Act, 50 J.L. & ECON. 597,
600 (2007).
216 Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 187, at 256.
217 Briggs Depew et al., New Deal or No Deal in the Cotton South: The Effect
of the AAA on the Agricultural Labor Structure, 50 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST.
466, 466–67 (2013). Depew et al. suggest that “[t]he major program of the [Agricultural Adjustment Administration (‘AAA’)] involved paying farmers to take
land out of production with a goal of reducing agricultural output and therefore placing upward pressure on output prices.” Id. at 467.
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the divergence in outcome between the two agencies is that NIRA
was built on a weak bureaucratic administration, while the Adjustment Act benefitted from skilled career personnel who were
effective at policy making and implementation.218
On the one hand, NIRA inherited the more anemic side of
what was an unevenly developed American federal bureaucracy.219
The program was essentially built on a model that relied on outside
experts who were not permanently situated within the government.220 And, while well-organized private sector special interests
had tremendous influence over how the NIRA functioned, including
its strategies, the eventual outcomes were not viewed as beneficial
to these groups.221 Skocpol and Finegold theorize that the failure
of organized interest groups to achieve their desired goals, especially given a weak government bureaucracy, is counterintuitive.222
Pursuant to public choice theory, we would expect that “the best
organized interest groups in society, and those with access to the
greatest political skills and resources, would be the ones to achieve
their political goals in ‘the governmental process.’”223
On the other hand, the Adjustment Agency inherited the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—a bureaucracy with immense capabilities.224 The USDA had benefitted from a unique
history.225 Congress had passed the Morrill Act in 1862, “authorizing federal land grants to support the establishment in each state
of a college oriented to agricultural research and education.”226
Graduates of these colleges were actively recruited to the USDA.227
And, over time, an arguably uniform identity of professional backgrounds and expertise—not to mention an emphasis on research
and policy making—emerged.228
Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 187, at 257–61.
Id. at 261–68.
220 Id. at 262.
221 Id. at 259–60.
222 Id. at 259.
223 Id. at 259–60.
224 Id. at 270.
225 Id. at 271–73.
226 Id. at 273; see also NATHAN M. SORBER, LAND GRANT COLLEGES AND
POPULAR REVOLT: THE ORIGINS OF THE MORRILL ACT AND THE REFORM OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 54 (2018).
227 Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 187, at 273.
228 Id. at 273–74.
218
219
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Ultimately, the proficiency in the USDA was so formidable
that civil servants “were willing to make policy for, rather than
just with, the farmers and their organizations.”229 Arguably, “their
training and career experiences had given them a concrete sense
of what could (and could not) be done with available governmental means.”230 Moreover, these civil servants were able to skillfully balance the interests of the state, the larger public, and
agriculture special interests to achieve “a programmatically coherent course” of policies, strategies, and outcomes.231 It is this
seemingly intangible quality that appears to separate high capacity
states from others.232 Economists Pranab Bardhan suggests that
“a more general characteristic of a strong and effective state is
the capacity to make credible commitments in the face of pressures from diverse interest groups.”233
In short, state capacity requires competent bureaucracies
and strong leadership that can utilize the levers of government
toward a chosen agenda.234 But, admittedly, even if a state has
the capacity to fend off the pressures of special interests, the
political will to do so may not always be present. Scholars argue
that “constraints on executive power are considered necessary to
restrain pandering to narrow interests or self-aggrandizement
on the part of the leadership.”235 This suggests a crucial role for
law and legal institutions as both a means of constraining the
executive (e.g., via a constitutional order with checks and balances)
and a mechanism for policy implementation.236 In other words,
once the policy goal is identified, an effective state readily targets the laws and institutions it intends to use to achieve these
ends.237 A talented bureaucracy employs internal experts who
can interpret and deploy rules in a manner suitable for the chosen economic and social policies.238
Id. at 274.
Id.
231 Id. at 275.
232 Bardhan, supra note 110, at 866–67.
233 Id. at 867.
234 Id. at 866–67, 869.
235 Id. at 863.
236 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547–
48 (2018) (noting how constitutions and law can be used to achieve illiberal goals).
237 Bardhan, supra note 110, at 866–68.
238 Bureaucracy, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/re
sources/knowledge/other/bureaucracy/ [https://perma.cc/Z675-D39P].
229
230
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C. State Capacity, Bureaucracy, and Development
As a general matter, legal scholars do not routinely analyze bureaucratic structure and strategy when exploring the
relationship between law and economic development.239 In this
regard, the theoretical connection between bureaucratic capacity,
institutions and economic development remains underexplored in
the legal academic literature. But, as legal scholarship has become
more interdisciplinary,240 there is growing interest in the value
that disciplines like sociology can bring to legal analysis.241 For
example, legal scholar Chantal Thomas has built on a broad range
of literatures to bolster the argument for an “institutional analysis
of institutionalism” as it pertains to theoretical and practical aspects of the relationship between law and economic development.242
Thomas has specifically explored how ideas from sociology can inform our understanding of law’s role in development.243 For example, Thomas artfully explains how sociologist Max Weber’s early
theories on modern government made the connection between
government bureaucracy and the type of “legal system that allows capitalism to thrive.”244
In a similar manner, legal scholar Alvaro Santos has meticulously tied the role of a precise form of state capacity—“legal
capacity”—to the economic success of developing countries by

239 See,

e.g., Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 899–902 (discussing the history of law and development studies).
240 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1995) (discussing “the principal nondoctrinal subfields”).
241 See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and The Sociology
of Legal Reform: A Reassessment With Implications for Law and Development, 15
MINN. J. INT’L L. 383, 385–86 (2006) [hereinafter Thomas, Implications for Law
and Development]; see also Davis, Legal Indicators, supra note 167, at 38–44.
242 See Thomas, Institutions, supra note 35, at 1018 (discussing the flaws
in law and neoclassical economic development).
243 See Thomas, Implications for Law and Development, supra note 241, at 383
(discussing “the influence of Weberian thought on a particular strain of policy
discourse on law and development that emerged during the mid-twentieth
century in the United States”).
244 Id.
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focusing on international trade law.245 Similar to the analysis
employed by Skocpol and Finegold, Santos makes the case that
investments in a talented cadre of civil servants—in this case,
government lawyers—who can effectively coordinate legal strategy
in a forum like the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) “dispute
settlement system”246 with their government’s economic policy
objectives is one path to growth.247 More precisely, “[c]ountries
that actively pursue heterodox development policies are also more
likely to invest in their local legal capacity and to rely on it to
advance their national policy goals.”248
To demonstrate the importance of the state capacity framework, Santos uses case studies of Mexico and Brazil.249 Santos
explains the difference in policy autonomy250 via the WTO litigation
forum in terms of “developmental legal capacity,” which is the
ability to effectively use legal expertise to further “national policy
goals.”251 According to Santos, for an emerging economy to play
the international trade game well, “[it] needs to carve out [local
policy autonomy] deliberately, which requires a great degree of
training, coordination, and institutional capability.”252
Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries
in the World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA.
J. INT’L L. 551, 554 (2012).
246 The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) has a well-developed system for
resolving trade disputes among its member governments. See WTO, A Unique
Contribution, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5REA-P7MN]. “The system is based on clearly-defined rules,
with timetables for completing a case. First rulings are made by a panel and
endorsed (or rejected) by the WTO’s full membership. Appeals based on points
of law are possible.” Id.
247 Santos, supra note 245, at 592. Santos introduces “the concept of ‘developmental legal capacity,’ which acknowledges that trade law can be both a
sword to open markets and a shield for heterodox policies.” Id. at 554.
248 Id. This framework is built in part on a socio-legal analysis of the litigation process. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 95–97 (1974); see also
Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 803, 807 (1999).
249 Santos, supra note 245, at 596–628.
250 Santos describes “policy autonomy [as] the space that a country can
create by mobilizing its legal capacity to use the rule and doctrinal flexibility
of the WTO in the service of a developmental strategy.” Id. at 606.
251 Id. at 554.
252 Id. at 555.
245

2021]

STATE CAPACITY

231

A part of this institutional strength is access to government lawyers who can translate economic policy into international
legal rules that expand domestic policy autonomy and, ultimately,
economic growth.253 For example, Brazil’s development strategy
is one in which industrial policy is seen as a path to economic development.254 Mexico’s strategy for economic development “is
one of free trade liberalization.”255 In order to ensure their strategies are successful within a potentially constraining international
trade law context, each country has had to rely on its legal capacity
to win favorable judgments in front of the WTO.256 But Santos
argues Brazil’s legal capacity257 has been more well developed
and consequently more effective than Mexico’s legal capacity.258
Santos explains that “Brazil has built an institutional legal infrastructure that includes a trade team in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, a variety of intra-ministerial trade groups, and
established coordination mechanisms between the government
and the private sector and civil society.”259 In addition, Brazil’s
“Foreign Ministry lawyers have been sent for training to Brazil’s
permanent mission in the WTO and to trade litigation firms in
Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. As a result, Brazil has created
a cadre of lawyers who are able to represent the government in
the WTO dispute settlement system.”260
Id. at 609, 612.
Id. at 599 (noting that this model includes “trade promotion, industrial
policy and science, technology and innovation policy, finance, and social policy”).
255 Id. at 607.
256 Id. at 613.
257 Id. at 609. Santos argues that:
Brazil exhibits what can be described as developmental legal
capacity, geared to advance the country’s industrial policy agenda
through the government’s promotion of select, targeted sectors.
An important aspect of Brazil’s legal capacity is making sure
that the country’s legal strategies accord with the government’s
interests, not only for a given case but also systemically for the
future. So far, Brazil has been able to defend several of its industrial policies in the WTO against challenges from countries
that claimed they were violations of its WTO obligations.
Id. at 609.
258 Id. at 608–10.
259 Id. at 609.
260 Id.
253
254
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Mexico, however, has a weaker legal bureaucratic structure
in the international trade unit of its Ministry of the Economy.261
Instead of legal experts with long career tenures, “there has been
considerable turnover and limited institutional continuity to take
advantage of accumulated knowledge and experience.”262 Significantly, “[t]here are few incentives for people to stay and ascend
the career ladder, eventually pushing them out and losing valuable
human capital.”263 Notably, legal counsel from law firms—including
the United States—are relied on for help with litigation strategy.264
Notwithstanding Santos’s insightful work, scholars have yet
to make a direct link between this type of indigenous legal capacity
and OFC development.265 Given the limited resources of many
small jurisdictions that have become successful OFCs, it bears
exploring how these places are able to cultivate and coordinate the
expertise required to promote and sustain an offshore finance
sector. The next Part argues that a review of the colonial history
of OFCs may reveal insights into why some of the smaller OFC
jurisdictions have developed the deep capabilities and, indeed,
agency to forge ahead in the international finance arena.266
Id. at 609–10.
Id.
263 Id. at 610.
264 Id. Santos observes that “[t]here seems to be no movement towards investing in and training a cadre of Mexican lawyers that can do the bulk of the
lawyering and litigation.” Id. The assumption here, and one supported by a
range of scholars, is that the state is required to guide development, and that
the private sector alone was inadequate. Bardhan, supra note 110, at 864. Ultimately, the strategic investment in legal professionals and networks can be
core to economic growth given that laws and legal institutions are vehicles for
policy formulation and deployment. Santos, supra note 245, at 594.
265 See Santos, supra note 245, at 610.
266 See infra Part III. It is well accepted that the colonial experience has
undermined the bureaucratic capabilities of some developing countries. See,
e.g., KOHLI, STATE DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 1–24. There is a
compelling argument that the current institutional structures of many postcolonial developing economies were molded in the colonial era. Id.; see also
PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 27–28; DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON,
WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER 250–71 (2012). Political scientist Atul
Kohli proffers that countries like Nigeria experienced a particularly extractive
type of colonialism whereby Britain invested little in developing a well-run and
centralized state with an “effective civil service.” KOHLI, STATE DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 18. This left independent Nigeria with the
immense task of “overcom[ing] the original deficiencies of state construction.”
261
262



2021]

STATE CAPACITY

233

III.COLONIALISM, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
A. The Institutions-Development Paradigm
While OFCs have emerged in different parts of the world,
including Europe, Asia, the Pacific region, and the Commonwealth
Caribbean,267 this Article focuses on islands in the latter region
because they share sufficient similarities and differences for fruitful scholarly analysis. First, there is a strong historical connection between the British Empire and the development of major
financial centers, including in the Commonwealth Caribbean.268
Second, OFCs in this region are small islands that have comparable geographic and economic structures.269 Third, given the colonial history and demographics of these islands, they tend to share
similar cultural contexts.270 Nonetheless, the islands have also experienced divergence in economic performance.271 For example, the

Id. But, even if an ex-colony had a colonial history that encouraged the building
of high-quality institutions, political leadership is still required to skillfully
marshal them toward the selected policy goals. See, e.g., HENRY, supra note
42, at 21–44 (noting that Barbados and Jamaica inherited institutional features
that some scholars would consider beneficial to economic growth—foremost, the
British common law—but Barbados made better macroeconomic policy choices).
Scholars of state development have insightfully explained that: “An efficient state bureaucracy is merely a tool, and it can deliver on its potential
only if is deployed in the right direction, if it is partially insulated from interference, and when it can provide mechanisms to address contradictory forces.”
Centeno et al., supra note 43, at 11. In other words, leadership matters. And,
importantly, “a state’s effectiveness in a given sector can be judged only in
the context of a political decision to make that sector a priority.” Id.
267 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 149; Dharmapala & Hines, Which
Countries, supra note 15, at 1061–62; BRUNER, supra note 7, at 15–38.
268 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 124–49; Dharmapala & Hines, Which
Countries, supra note 15, at 1066; BRUNER, supra note 7, at 28–30.
269 See, e.g., Winston H. Griffith, CARICOM Countries and the Irrelevance of
Economic Smallness, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 939–58 (2007) [hereinafter Griffith,
Economic Smallness]; see also Winston H. Griffith, Caribbean Countries and
the Twenty-First Century, 18 CANADIAN J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 25,
25–27 (1993) [hereinafter Griffith, Caribbean Countries].
270 See, e.g., DAVID S. BERRY, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION LAW 17–35 (2014) (describing countries in the Caribbean region and summarizing their economies).
271 See, e.g., Winston H. Griffith, A Tale of Four CARICOM Countries, 36 J.
ECON. ISSUES 79, 102 (discussing “the economic performances of four CARICOM
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OFCs of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, The Bahamas,
and Grenada have all had varying levels of economic success.272
In recent decades, commentators have attempted to explain
the divergence in economic development among Caribbean islands.
Attention has swiftly turned to the role of institutions and governance in economic growth.273 Some scholars have debated whether
institutions or policy choices explain economic performance among
some of these countries.274 But little attention has been paid to
the OFC enterprise resident in some Caribbean jurisdictions as
a way of understanding how institutions—particularly legal institutions—are related to economic progress.
Since the 1990s, New Institutional Economics (NIE) scholars
and international finance institutions have been advocating for
“increasingly comprehensive notions of good governance in a globally integrated economy.”275 However, interestingly, OFCs had
already recognized that specific laws and legal practices were
useful for growth.276 For example, as early as the 1930s several
jurisdictions, including Bermuda and the Bahamas, were actively
using legislation to attract foreign businesses.277 Bermuda began
its offshore enterprise in 1935 by incorporating “what many believe


countries from about 1970 to 1997”) [hereinafter Griffith, CARICOM Countries];
see also Peter B. Henry & Conrad Miller, Institutions vs. Policies: A Tale of Two
Islands 2–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14604, 2008).
272 See, e.g., DILLON ALLEYNE ET AL., PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE CARIBBEAN 2019–2020, 81 (2020); J. Rogrigo Fuentes et al.,
Understanding Economic Growth in the Caribbean Region: A Conceptual and
Methodological Study 1–56 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank Working Paper No. IDBWP-595, 2015).
273 See, e.g., Griffin, CARICOM Countries, supra note 271, at 84–92 (discussing institutions and development where it concerns, Barbados, Guyana,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago).
274 See, e.g., Henry & Miller, supra note 271, at 10–11 (arguing that policy
choices matter more for economic growth); PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 21–
119.
275 Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation
Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199, 206 (2004).
276 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 126, 137.
277 See id. at 126–27; BRUNER, supra note 7, at 57; see also Freyer & Morriss,
supra note 125, at 1315.
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was the first exempt company in the world.”278 Cayman began its
international business efforts in 1966 by passing “the Banks and
Trust Companies Regulation Law, the Trusts Law, and the Exchange Control Regulations Law, and [further developed] its 1960s
companies law.”279
One could reasonably argue that NIE scholars were late
to the game.280 It was already clear to a subset of developing jurisdictions281 that “the design and functioning” of legal institutions were relevant for economic growth.282 But since OFCs did
not emerge fully formed, we should consider their historical origins for clues as to why some jurisdictions gained more traction
in the international finance market than other aspiring places.283
B. The End of the British Empire
As World War I came to a close, states began to explore
various ways to rebuild their economies.284 “[F]ollowing the end
of [the war] through the early 1970s, a small number of states
led by Switzerland began to develop tax havens as [one] international development strategy.”285 There quickly arose a significant number of OFCs of “English legal origins across those small
jurisdictions active in cross-border finance.”286 The growth of these
PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 126; see also OFFSHORE COMMERCIAL
LAW IN BERMUDA 12–13 (Ian RC Kawaley ed., 2013).
279 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 137.
280 Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 900–02.
281 It bears emphasizing that some OFCs are not independent nations, but
are territories. PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 149. Examples include Cayman,
Bermuda, and British Virgin Islands. Id. at 124.
282 Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 902.
283 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 112, 130.
284 Richard N. Cooper, Fettered to Gold? Economic Policy in the Interwar
Period, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 2120, 2121–22 (1992). Switzerland is considered to be the first OFC (i.e., outside of the United States), along with Liechtenstein and Luxemburg. PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 107. According to
Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux, “Switzerland was known as a tax haven in
the 1920s.” Id.; see also Alstadsaeter et al., supra note 10, at 2.
285 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 108. Palan and his co-authors note that
Switzerland was the first country to copy the U.S. states where it concerned
innovating around laws in order to attract corporations. Id. at 111.
286 See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 28; PALAN ET AL. supra note 53, at 149
(noting that “the largest [group of tax havens] is made up of the UK-based or
British Empire–based tax havens”).
278
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jurisdictions in the international finance sector has made it difficult for scholars to ignore the apparent connection between English
common law heritage and OFC development.287 This link emanates from the British colonial history of many of these jurisdictions.288 According to Palan et al.:
Modern tax havens are still largely organized in three groups.
First and still by far the largest is made of the UK-based or
British Empire–based tax havens. Centered on the City of London
and fed by the Euromarket, it consists of the Crown Dependencies, Overseas Territories, Pacific atolls, Singapore, and Hong
Kong. The second consists of European havens, specializing in
headquarter centers, financial affiliates, and private banking.
The third consists of a disparate group of either emulators, such
as Panama, Uruguay, and Dubai, or new havens from the transition economies and Africa.289

Given the diversity of OFCs, it is apparent that the common
law alone does not explain the rise and relative success of some
of these types of jurisdictions.290 If the common law was the secret to success, as some economists have previously argued,291 all
the aforementioned territories and post-colonies of Britain should
be equally prominent and successful—but this is certainly not the
case.292 In fact, scholars have recognized a small subset of these
common law jurisdictions, like Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and
Cayman, that have gained a global reputation for cross-border
finance and as corporate law havens.293

DAM, supra note 40, at 26–28; BRUNER, supra note 7, at 28; PALAN ET
supra note 53, at 149; see also Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and
Opportunities Are Created by Tax Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661,
663 (2008).
288 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 124–25.
289 Id. at 149.
290 See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 29–30.
291 See, e.g., La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 180, at 298.
292 Katie Warren, The top 15 tax havens around the world, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 19, 2019, 11:24 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tax-havens-for-mil
lionaires-around-the-world-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/9XA2-HE2T].
293 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1427 (highlighting the prominence of Bermuda, Cayman, and the British Virgin Islands);
BRUNER, supra note 7, at 51–187 (highlighting the success of Bermuda,
287

AL.,
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OFCs in the British Commonwealth were cultivated over
time and from afar.294 Their beginnings can be traced to British
courts circa 1876 with court rulings that “allow[ed] companies to
incorporate in Britain without paying tax.”295 Due to the nature
of the common law and the expanse of the British Empire at the
time, this type of ruling was binding on remote colonies like
“Bermuda, the Bahamas, and later the Cayman Islands and Hong
Kong.”296 Commentators have described how elites in London
capitalized on this allowance and orchestrated a network of offshore centers throughout the Caribbean to serve their interests.297
But there is more to this narrative.298
Much of the story began after World War II when Britain
lacked the financial and military capacity to hold and maintain its
colonies.299 At the same time, London had developed “a relatively
powerful, and more importantly, internationally-oriented financial
sector.”300 Thus Britain was “in search of quick and easy ‘savings’ to

Singapore, and other jurisdictions); see also Freyer & Morris, supra note 125,
at 1297–1398 (highlighting the rise of Cayman).
294 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 124–42.
295 Id. at 112.
296 Id. at 115; see, e.g., Todd v. Egyptian Delta Land & Inv. Co. [1929] 1 KB
119, 150 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (a key case in the United Kingdom that
allowed foreign firms registered in the United Kingdom to avoid taxation
because they operated elsewhere).
297 See SHAXSON, supra note 74, at 88–91.
298 At the fall of the British Empire, elites in Britain sought to retain their
global power through a less visible means—international finance. Id. at 88. This
was made feasible by the Bank of England, which allowed English Banks to engage in unregulated foreign transactions in foreign currency. Id. These types
of transactions slowly and deliberately spread to Britain’s offshore territories,
perhaps the most well-known being Cayman. Id. The City of London of Corporation, as distinct from the City of London, was at the center of this development. Id. Indeed, the accommodating regulations of the Bank of England,
which was heavily influenced by the City of London Corporation, made London
an attractive place to foreign banks. But London was not enough. Id. Banks
situated in the City of London Corporation would in turn establish branches
in former colonies and current territories of Britain. Id. at 89.
299 See JOHN DARWIN, BRITAIN AND DECOLONIZATION: THE RETREAT FROM
EMPIRE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD 3–33 (1988); Ronen Palan, International
Financial Centers: The British Empire, City-States and Commercially Oriented
Politics, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 149, 174 (2010).
300 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 165.
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maintain its unwieldy empire” and was consequently, “keen to embrace tax haven status for its small colonial outposts, because it
kept the local elites happy and lowered payments from London.”301
At the time of the British Empire’s decline, its currency was
weakening, and “the British government imposed strict restrictions
on the use of the pound sterling in trade credits with nonresidents.”302 The British pound had sunk so low in value at the end of
World War II that “no one wanted to hold it.”303 As an alternative, British banks began to use other currencies when engaging in
international transactions—such as the U.S. dollar—claiming that
this was allowable under the relevant banking restrictions at the
time.304 These types of transactions were referred to as “Euromarket transactions” and the Bank of England did not penalize them.305
Consequently, among other standard banking requirements, “reserve depository requirements were not applied to Euromarket
transactions.”306 They were deemed to be foreign transactions that
were technically not within the Bank of England’s jurisdiction.307
In short, these unregulated Euromarket transactions were considered early offshore banking transactions.308 These unregulated
markets ultimately became both feasible and popular beyond the
shores of England.309
OFCs exist in different parts of the world where Britain
had colonies, but the islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean have
a high concentration.310 For example, seven of the United Kingdom’s current fourteen Overseas Territories, and three Crown
Dependencies, are deemed OFCs.311 These are the Overseas Territories of “Bermuda, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands,
Gibraltar, Turks and Caicos, Anguilla, and Montserrat,” and the
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 160.
303 JOHN DARWIN, UNFINISHED EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL EXPANSION
352 (2013).
304 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 160.
305 Id. at 161.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 167.
310 Id. at 124.
311 Id.
301
302
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“Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man.”312
A majority of the Overseas Territories are in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, which makes them particularly worthy of further
study and comparison with non-OFC jurisdictions of similar
geography, colonial history and size where it concerns OFC development.313 It bears noting that several independent Commonwealth Caribbean post-colonies are also considered OFCs.314
These include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Grenada,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, as well as Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines.315
C. Searching for State Capacity
The political climate in Britain’s tiny Caribbean colonies
and overseas territories provided a ripe atmosphere for OFC development during the post–World War II period.316 Many of these
jurisdictions had become interested in international finance
because of what they thought it could do for their economies.317
Two factors were particularly critical to the OFC enterprise in
these places. First, nationalism was on the rise—with local elites
vigorously making the case for political independence.318 These
elites wanted self-governance—or at least local legislative autonomy.319 Second, there was a desire to transform their economies
to serve the needs of growing populations.320 For those colonies
that ultimately achieved their sovereignty—predominantly between
the 1960s and ’80s—they were faced with serious economic

Id.
See, e.g., Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1423 (explaining that it is worth studying Bermuda, BVI, and Cayman because of their
global prominence).
314 BRUNER, supra note 7, at 21.
315 See Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1067.
316 See id. at 1060.
317 See id.
318 See, e.g., CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR., THE SOCIOLOGY OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF NATIONALIST ATTITUDES AMONG WEST INDIAN LEADERS
308 (1967).
319 See, e.g., Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1338.
320 BERRY, supra note 270, at 17–35.
312
313
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difficulties.321 The colonial enterprise had nurtured plantation
economies throughout most of the Caribbean to service the needs
of the British Empire.322 The elites in the post-colonies and remaining British Overseas Territories (BOTs) thought it was crucial to reorient the economies they inherited toward different
and more productive types of commercial activities.323 Further,
after centuries of colonial rule, these small Caribbean jurisdictions
were actively in pursuit of new and more sophisticated sources
of economic growth.324
Economic diversification became the new goal, and business,
community, and political leaders within these jurisdictions were
eager to find new sources of foreign exchange to pay for the imports
they required.325 While this budding desire for self-governance and
economic growth blossomed, Britain—London in particular—saw
its small territories and former colonies as an ideal way to develop a
network of offshore jurisdictions that could funnel business back
to the Empire.326 Some commentators note that:
Serious discussions of the introduction of wealth taxes in Britain
also created a growing demand for offshore products within the
sterling area (as the exchange control area managed by the
British and incorporating both colonies and some former colonies were known), as did the weakening of capital controls
brought about by the British return to current account convertibility in 1959.327

Id.
Id. Since the colonial enterprise was predominantly skewed toward external (British) interests as opposed to local ones, the economy that remained
at the time of political independence required reform. Id. According to Alex
Dupuy, “[t]he purpose of colonization was obviously to secure new markets and
sources of raw materials, and wealth for colonizing powers.” Alex Dupuy, Slavery
and Underdevelopment in the Caribbean: A Critique of the “Plantation Economy”
Perspective, 7(3) DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 238 (1983); see also ERIC
WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 98–107 (1994).
323 See Dupuy, supra note 322, at 237–38; BERRY, supra note 270, at 17–35.
324 See, e.g., Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1303.
325 See, e.g., Griffith, Economic Smallness, supra note 269, at 939–58; see also
Griffith, Caribbean Countries, supra note 269, at 25–27.
326 See SHAXSON, supra note 74, at 87–106.
327 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1312.
321
322
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Further, there was an abiding concern in Britain328 that those colonies that had not pursued political independence would remain
indefinitely dependent upon the Empire.329
One concern was the limited capabilities of these small jurisdictions.330 According to Ronen Palan, “whereas large, heavily
populated states have a great many instruments of competition
at their disposal, the smallest states cannot realistically compete
for large-scale production or manufacturing facilities, nor can they
compete in high-value sectors.”331 With the potential for a steady
flow of foreign investors, the offshore financial market promised
to create a new growth engine for these small economies.332 And,
with that possibility, offshore financial services emerged as a viable
development strategy.333 The fundamental tools for this kind of
activity—a ready market, attractive business laws, and skilled
professionals—were within reach for even the smaller and more
resource-constrained jurisdictions.334
328 But it would be a mistake to frame the British position as monolithic or
uniform. Id. Interest groups within the government had divergent concerns.
Id. Andrew Morriss and Lotta Moberg note:
During internal British government debates over the establishment of tax havens in Britain’s overseas territories, the British Treasury worried about revenue losses, the Foreign and
Colonial Office about the fiscal sustainability of the territories
and their budgetary impact on Britain, and the Bank of England
about the implications for exchange control.
Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s
Campaign Against Harmful Tax Competition, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 11 (2012).
329 Tony Freyer and Andrew Morriss note that:
Given its concerns over being left with an expensive legacy of
financially dependent territories, Britain’s interest in the region
focused on finding a means for fiscal self-sufficiency in the
Caribbean. The Colonial Office was intent that Britain not be
‘left with a residue of financially dependent territories such as
Caymans, Turks and Caicos, and the British Virgin Islands.’
Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1318.
330 Id. at 1312.
331 PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 167; see Enriquez & Centeno, supra note
176, at 130–32; Soifer & vom Hau, supra note 178, at 1.
332 See generally ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW (2002).
333 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 159–60.
334 See id. at 184–85.
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But, despite the social and economic forces pushing toward
international finance, not all of Commonwealth Caribbean postcolonies would become OFCs—nor find economic growth.335 And,
of those who became OFCs, not all would become successful—as
measured by the number of incorporations and investments
flowing to their shores.336 William Moon notes that “corporations
traded on American securities markets like the New York Stock
Exchange tend to cluster around only a handful of jurisdictions,
suggesting that there is something more than tax motivating
their behavior.”337 For example, as of 2018, 18.5% of foreign corporations338 were incorporated in the Cayman Islands and 5.8%
were incorporated in Bermuda.339 BVI accounted for 4.5% of
foreign incorporations.340 According to Moon, “about a quarter of
firms incorporated in foreign nations are accounted for by three
jurisdictions ... the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and [BVI].”341
D. Institutional Learning and State Capacity
It is generally accepted that colonial history matters for
development.342 But scholars have only recently begun to explore
how specific kinds of colonial experiences may have impacted current approaches to institutional development, including the rule
of law, in the post-colonial period.343 For example, legal scholars
Ronald Daniels, Michael Trebilcock, and Lindsey Carson suggest
that the various ways the British governed their colonies and
the way citizens of those colonies responded to the chosen governance model mattered for “the long-run, stable commitment to
legality” when the colony became a sovereign state.344 The authors
focus on specific features of British colonial governance.345 They
See Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1060, 1064.
Id.
337 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1426–27.
338 Moon uses this term to refer to “firms incorporated in foreign nations”—
that is, not in the United States. Id. at 1424–26.
339 Id. at 1427.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 1426.
342 See, e.g., ATUL KOHLI, IMPERIALISM AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: HOW
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES SHAPED THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY 1 (2020).
343 See, e.g., KOHLI, STATE DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 1.
344 Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 127.
345 Id.
335
336
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investigate “(1) the degree of representation in legislative bodies
afforded to the indigenous population and (2) the extent to which
indigenous and British common law courts and animating values
were integrated, fostering the development of a localized common
law jurisprudence.”346 In short, the authors suggest colonial history may have played a critical role in the “long-term persistence”
of how law and legal institutions are perceived and designed for
development in some places.347
But not all well-designed laws will serve their desired
ends.348 Some scholars of development note “it is not the case that
once institutional rules are established, role occupants blindly
follow. Instead, they constantly modify the rules, transform them,
and bypass them in the course of their daily interaction.”349 Institutions are therefore only as effective as the actors who engage
and change them—i.e., they are products of the social environment.350 A key difference between successful and unsuccessful
OFCs (or merely aspiring OFCs) in the area of regulatory competition may relate to social environment within which the state’s
institutional capabilities developed.351
Orlando Patterson proposes that institutional knowledge
matters for development.352 Indeed, it may reasonably be considered a type of state capacity.353 Patterson suggests there are two
types of institutional knowledge: “declarative and procedural.”354
The difference between the two is in the how.355 “Declarative knowledge can be learned verbally, whereas procedural knowledge is
learned only through observation and practice; it is, for example,
Id.
Id. at 113; see Luigi Guiso et al., Long-Term Persistence, 14 J. EUR. ECON.
ASSOC. 1401, 1410 (2016).
348 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 22–38.
349 Alejandro Portes, Institutions and Development: A Conceptual Reanalysis,
in INSTITUTIONS COUNT: THEIR ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE IN LATIN AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 191, at 8.
350 See NORTH, supra note 35, at 1018–23. According to Centeno and Portes,
“[n]o doubt, ‘institutions matter,’ but they are themselves subject to ... ‘the problem of embeddedness’: The fact that the human exchanges that institutions seek
to guide in turn affect these institutions.” Centeno & Portes, supra note 164, at 8.
351 Centeno & Portes, supra note 164, at 8.
352 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 25–26.
353 See id. at 24–26.
354 Id. at 25.
355 Id.
346
347
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the difference between knowing what a bicycle is and does and
how to ride one.”356
According to this thesis, “institutional learning and practice” may explain the divergent economic development outcomes
of countries.357 Countries must inherit an appropriate degree of
“procedural knowledge” to effectively manage and adapt their institutions in ways that will produce high levels of economic (and
social) gain in the long run.358 While declarative knowledge (e.g.,
specific legal rules) is important, perhaps procedural knowledge
is more critical for coordinating factors like network externalities,
the influence of special interests on legal reform, and legal institutional isomorphism for economic competition.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING AND OFC DEVELOPMENT
This Part explicitly connects the colonial history of Caribbean
jurisdictions, the state capacity concept and the development of
OFC status. It suggests that state capacity may have been harnessed in a particular manner in some Commonwealth Caribbean
jurisdictions, which made them well suited for the OFC enterprise.
More specifically, OFC state capacity may have emanated from
specific types of institutional learning.359 The cases of Barbados,
Cayman Islands, and Jamaica—three Commonwealth Caribbean
jurisdictions—demonstrate the differences in institutional learning during the colonial period and how this learning may have
influenced both the decision to become an OFC and the level of
success ultimately attained once that choice was made.360
Barbados, Cayman Islands, and Jamaica represent points on
a spectrum. Cayman is a well-developed OFC.361 Cayman is a territory of Britain and one of the world’s most prominent OFC.362
Id.
Id. at 22–24.
358 Id. at 107–13. Patterson argues that Barbados’s greater economic success
compared to Jamaica’s is due to a British colonial history that facilitated a greater
degree of procedural knowledge about institutions of governance than the colonial
history experienced by Jamaica, which only afforded leaders declarative knowledge. Id. at 107–09.
359 See infra Section IV.A.
360 See infra Section IV.A.
361 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1426.
362 See id. at 1448; Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1297–1300.
356
357
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Barbados is a sovereign nation, ex-colony of Britain, and a reasonably well-developed OFC.363 Jamaica is also a sovereign nation
and ex-colony of Britain, but it is not an OFC.364
This Part uses cases from the Commonwealth Caribbean
for two key reasons. First, the jurisdictions in this region generally reflect a strong tie between British colonial heritage and OFC
activity.365 Specifically, this selection of jurisdictions control for
the British common law tradition—i.e., declarative knowledge
inherited during the colonial period. Christopher Bruner artfully
notes that the connection of OFC activity to English legal origins
in small jurisdictions “has been so frequently remarked upon that
it is worth exploring, at least briefly, how far this might take us
in describing and evaluating this category of jurisdictions.”366
Second, these small jurisdictions provide more readily available and accessible case studies that can prove insightful to
larger and more complex societies.367 Economist Peter Blair Henry
argues wealthier countries can learn important economic lessons
about growth from smaller developing nations.368
As noted in Part II, some scholars argue that a state with
a well-qualified and reasonably autonomous bureaucracy is well
governed and capable of good policy choices.369 In the case of
OFCs, successful non-American jurisdictions like Cayman and
Barbados, arguably have a well-developed bureaucracy of experts
specially equipped to address financial regulations and adjust to
changing international politics.370

See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 89–96.
See id.
365 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1064–66.
366 BRUNER, supra note 7, at 28.
367 Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1065–66.
368 HENRY, supra note 42, at 17–19.
369 See supra Part II; Fukuyama, What Is Governance?, supra note 146, at
360. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama suggests that if an “agency were full of
professionals with graduate degrees from internationally recognized schools,
one would not just feel safer granting them considerable autonomy, but would
actually want to reduce rule boundedness in hopes of encouraging innovative
behavior.” Id.
370 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1300; PATTERSON, supra note
33, at 104–05.
363
364
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These experts understand the overarching policy directives of elected officials and are able to suggest and implement
regulations geared at achieving these goals.371 To the extent that
these bureaucrats are professionals—accountants and lawyers, for
example—they are typically self-regulated and bound by “professional norms that seek to preclude certain self-seeking behavior.”372
This combination of deep expertise, autonomy, and normative guidance suggests that the ability to coordinate key professional networks,373 effectively blend public sector goals with private sector
innovations,374 and choose other jurisdictions with which the OFC
should be isomorphic in terms of rules and institutional design.375
A. Learning Confidence in Lawmaking: Barbados v. Jamaica
Consider the cases of Barbados and Jamaica, two small
Commonwealth Caribbean island ex-colonies of Britain.376 Barbados has become an OFC in the post-colonial period, but Jamaica
has not, despite both countries’ inheritance of British common law
institutions.377 One explanation for this divergence could be the
difference in size between the islands.378 Jamaica has a land mass
of 27,750 square kilometers and is just shy of three million people,
compared to Barbados, which is 430 square kilometers with a population just over 280,000 people.379 A smaller jurisdiction may
PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 107–08.
See Fukuyama, What Is Governance?, supra note 146, at 361.
373 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1336–41. (Here, this Article
refers to those networks of professionals in the country, as well as those that
flock to their shores from North American countries.)
374 See Fukuyama, What Is Governance?, supra note 146, at 361.
375 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 99–104.
376 Legal scholars and social scientists have undertaken careful comparative economic, legal, and socio-historical studies of both island nations. See,
e.g., Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 131; PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 89–90;
HENRY, supra note 42, at 21–44; Martin W. Sybblis, Law, Growth, and the Identity Hurdle: A Theory of Legal Reform, 95 TUL. L. REV. 867, 896–901 (2021).
377 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 89–103.
378 Id. at 87.
379 See BERRY, supra note 270, at 11; Jamaica—World Bank Open Data—
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=JM
[https://perma.cc/PP6L-Q5EQ]; Barbados—World Bank Open Data—WORLD
BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BB [https://
perma.cc/5EF3-SKBG].
371
372
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lack a substantial local corporate sector from which it can derive
taxes and consequently may be more likely to look externally for
revenue opportunities.380 On a related note, as compared to larger
jurisdictions, smaller jurisdictions may be more prone to legislative capture by external special interests because they may lack
significant domestic constituencies to resist these interests.381 But
this explanation does not account for several larger countries than
Barbados that are prominent OFCs—e.g., Singapore, with a population of over five million people.382
Another potential explanation for Barbados’s status as an
OFC and Jamaica’s status as a non-OFC is how each country’s
community economic identity (CEI)—i.e., “public and recognizable identities developed by community leaders”383—was formed
in the decades following the colonial period.384 Indeed, it has been
argued that CEI informs a community’s development strategy and
legal reform choices in the business arena.385 But CEI itself is
influenced by, among other factors, a jurisdiction’s resources and
historical choices, both of which implicate state capacity considerations.386 Colonial history may play a critical role in the “longterm persistence” of resource constraints and perceptions about
how development should unfold to support a new political and
economic identity in the post-colonial period.387 A look into the
actual process of institution formation as a vehicle for state capacity could provide some insights here.388
For example, as of 1834—after the abolition of slavery—
and contrary to the trend to abolish representative legislatures
in colonial island outposts,389 Barbados kept its representative
See Dharmapala & Hines, Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1065–66;
Dharmapala, supra note 287, at 663.
381 Dharmapala, supra note 287, at 663–65.
382 Singapore—World Bank Open Data, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.world
bank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SG [https://perma.cc/QJ9J-4LF3].
383 Sybblis, supra note 376, at 871.
384 Id. at 896.
385 Id. at 930–31.
386 Id.
387 See Luigi Guiso et al., Long-Term Persistence, 14 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N
1401, 1433 (2016).
388 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 104.
389 See Jean-Paul Carvalho & Christian Dippel, Elite Identity and Political
Accountability: A Tale of Ten Islands, 130 ECON. J. 1995, 2006–07 (2020); see
also PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 41.
380
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legislature.390 This was due to a unique socio-history of slavery
which made Barbadian colonists feel sufficiently comfortable and
less threatened by the ex-slave population to make the island home
and build durable institutions.391 This choice may have inadvertently served an important role in the islands post-colonial
development.392 The retention of the legislature allowed Black
Barbadians—albeit at a slow pace—the early ability to participate in the local legislature.393 This allowed them early exposure
390 Carvalho & Dippel, supra note 389, at 1996–97 (noting that Barbados did
not terminate its legislative assembly and “was also the only island [of ten studied]
not to experience significant change in the composition of the political elite, with
the old [W]hite elite holding more than 90% of assembly seats.”).
391 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 40–42.
392 Carvalho & Dippel, supra note 389, at 2021–22. According to Patterson,
the geography of Barbados—especially physical landscape and relative mildness of
the climate—played an important role in making colonists feel welcome and willing to invest their time and energy in building local institutions. PATTERSON,
supra note 33, at 40–42. Factors, including greater access to suitable land for
sugar plantations and the ability to sufficiently control rebellions, also made
the island desirable to colonists. Id. at 38–39. For example, Patterson notes that
“[f]ar more committed to residence on the island, Barbadian [W]hites were likelier
[than their Jamaican counterparts] to regard the island as their permanent home
rather than to yearn for the leisurely life of an absentee landlord in Britain.”
Id. at 44. Where it concerned the post-emancipation period, Patterson argues:
So confident was the Barbadian elite of its control of the Barbadian working class that Barbados was the only Caribbean
island not to abolish its system of elite representative government in the latter half of the nineteenth century in favor of
direct Crown colony rule from Britain out of fear of being taken
over by the increasingly educated colored groups. The Barbadian Assembly remained in place until the 1950s, which contributed to securing a three-hundred-year history of legislative
continuity. Another remarkable expression of the elite’s selfconfidence appeared much earlier, as the island’s police force
was composed entirely of Afro-Barbadians by 1842, a mere four
years after the abolition of slavery.
Id. at 64.
393 See Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 138–41. Economists Jean-Paul Carvalho
and Christian Dippel, suggest that Barbados’s geography was important to the
post-colonial franchise of Blacks. See Carvalho & Dippel, supra note 389, at
2022. The island “consisted of flat limestone rather than rugged volcanic stone.”
Id. The consequence was significant. See id. According to the scholars:
This meant plantations comprised of 95% of land on the eve of
emancipation, compared with under 50% elsewhere in the
Caribbean. Therefore, post-emancipation Barbados had no hinterland that [B]lack citizens could purchase, so they obtained
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to the power and promise of the legislative process long before the
country achieved political independence 132 years later in 1966.394
By contrast, and as a direct result of its own socio-history of
slavery, in 1865 the legislative body in Jamaica was dissolved.395
This was done “at the request of [W]hite colonists concerned about
the emerging political power of the former slaves in their colony.”396
Black Jamaicans experienced arbitrary state rule and were excluded from meaningful opportunities for practice with self-governance.397 Jamaicans, therefore, inherited a post-colonial state,
including a bureaucracy, which had limited experience with the
type of governance398 necessary for the rapid economic growth
required of the small post-colonial developing jurisdiction.399
The difference between Barbados and Jamaica—and other
British post-colonies for that matter—suggests that common law
inheritance and historical connections to Britain alone were not
sufficient for OFC formation or subsequent competitiveness.400
Experience with building and operating legal institutions may
have mattered more.401 Arguably, Black Barbadians had greater
experience with law making during the colonial period and were
therefore empowered by their ability to influence social policy,
placing opportunities like offshore finance squarely within their
institutional capabilities.402 Black Jamaicans would have to wait

the franchise at a much lower rate than elsewhere. As such, the
share of new elites in the Barbadian assembly remained below
10% throughout the nineteenth century. Changes in the composition of the Barbadian assembly were so muted that institutional change never became necessary ....
Carvalho & Dippel, supra note 389, at 2022.
394 Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 138–41, 139 n.101.
395 Id. at 140.
396 Id. at 131.
397 Id. at 140 n.103.
398 Commentators note that: “after nearly a century of political and economic exclusion, Jamaica’s [post-colonial] leadership focused on reorienting the
state apparatus to further the interest of indigenous Jamaicans (who were almost
all [B]lack working-class citizens), rather than crafting a limited government with
institutionalized checks and balances.” Id. at 140–41.
399 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 28–29.
400 DAM, supra note 40, at 49–55.
401 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 37.
402 According to Daniels et al.,
By retaining its representative legislature, Barbados continued
to provide its residents with a means of popular expression
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until 1944 to experience self-government.403 To the extent that
better governance is impacted by how a government deploys laws
and legal institutions for the general public welfare, earlier exposure to lawmaking and the actual method of institutional
learning are important variables to consider.404
Rather than viewing small island ex-colonies and existing
BOTs as homogenous places that are immediately receptive to
legislative capture in pursuit of foreign income, it is worth paying close attention to early strategies of both the colonizer and
the colonized regarding how institutions actually developed.405
For example, more deeply entrenched British political and legal
institutions emerged in Barbados by virtue of a colonial choice to
build a “settler elite democrac[y].”406 This meant the British colonists saw the island as a new and permanent home and invested
in churches, schools, “institutions of private property, parliamentary
democracy, the rule of law, and functioning judiciaries.”407 The
colonists did not have the same perception of Jamaica.408

through formal government channels, thereby opening opportunities for the development of diverse interests—divorced from
those of the state apparatus—that could in turn continue to
foster the institutional elements necessary for the functioning of
a rules-based, impartial, accessible, and efficient legal system.
Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 139.
403 According to Daniels et al.,
In 1865, they voted to dissolve the legislative council and switched
to crown colony status in order to maintain their monopolistic
control of economic and governmental power. The new nominative council structure did not afford any scope for elected
seats and consisted solely of [W]hite representatives; although a
small handful of elective seats were introduced by the Colonial
Governor in 1885, burdensome financial requirements for officeholders persisted and ultimately limited the ability of [B]lacks
to run for office. Blacks remained politically disempowered, while
power remained largely concentrated in the hands of a small
group of [W]hite British landholders and merchants until the
institution of universal suffrage in 1944.
Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 140.
404 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 112–13.
405 Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 155–58.
406 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 112; see also Daniels et al., supra note 33,
at 155–58.
407 PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 112.
408 Id. at 111–14.
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According to Patterson, British colonists viewed Jamaica
as unwelcoming due to its relatively harsher climate and terrain,
which made it less conducive to the development of dense sugar
plantations—a resource of great interest to them. The mountainous terrain was also more conducive to frequent slave uprisings.409 As a result, the colonist were disinclined to make the
island a permanent home and, consequently, the quality of institutional learning and governance capabilities that emerged there
were lower than in Barbados.410 This colonial history set the
stage for social instability and political turmoil in the early postcolonial years—which are not attractive for foreign investment
or suitable for growth.411
In addition to gaining greater social and political stability
in the colonial period than Jamaica, Patterson argues that Barbadians did not merely copy British institutions; they were able
to master them.412 This proficiency may account for the state
capacity to effectively engage in OFC activities.413 With it came
the ability to (1) capitalize on professional networks, (2) incorporate private sector innovation without significant legislative
capture, and (3) strategically choose the types of laws and regulations that best fit its growth policies—not merely copy them
from other jurisdictions.414
Id.; see also TREVOR BURNARD, JAMAICA IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 3
(2020); TOM ZOELLNER, ISLAND ON FIRE: THE REVOLT THAT ENDED SLAVERY IN
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 4 (2020).
410See generally PATTERSON, supra note 33.
411 See generally EVELYNE HUBER STEPHENS & JOHN D. STEPHENS, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN JAMAICA: THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN DEPENDENT CAPITALISM (1986) (providing a detailed historical
account of Jamaica with a focus on the interaction of economics and politics).
412 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 115.
413 According to Patterson:
British elite [W]hites, and increasingly upper-class [W]hite
Americans, find the Barbadian social system extremely congenial, and this has partly accounted for the growth of a flourishing offshore banking sector and expatriate [W]hite community,
a trend enabled by nimble legislative maneuvering.
PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 107.
414 Id. at 7–8; see also Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 133. These
abilities were on full display in the 1970s and 1990s when the country faced
financial hardship due to international economic crises. See Henry & Miller,
supra note 271, at 9–11. Policymakers controlled government spending, brought
409
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Barbados’s mastery of its legal institutions was also on
full display over the past few years, as the country reformed its
OFC sector.415 Despite vigorous and consistent opposition from
national leaders, the tiny Caribbean island was listed on European blacklists for its lack of transparency in international tax
matters.416 Accusations have primarily come from the European
Union (EU) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which represent some of the wealthiest
nations.417 In the wake of this effort to shame some OFCs, the
ongoing discourse over international tax policy took a curious turn
in the Barbadian parliament recently.418 The parliament repealed
legislation that granted tax preferences for international business
companies (IBCs)419 and now treats these entities as regular

public and private sector actors together and facilitated joint sacrifices—including
price constraints and wage cuts that helped to spur an economic revival. Id.
Henry and Miller suggest that:
Countries have no control over their geographic location, colonial heritage, or legal origin, but they do have agency over
the policies that they implement. Of particular importance for
small open economies (i.e., most countries in the world), is the
response of policy to macroeconomic shocks such as a fall in
terms of trade. Pedestrian as it may seem to say, changes in
policy, even those that do not have a permanent effect on growth
rates of GDP per capita, can have a significant impact on a
country’s standard of living within a single generation.
Id. at 11.
415 OECD Says Barbados Will Not Appear on its Forthcoming List of Uncooperative Tax Havens, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (Jan. 31, 2002), https://
www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/oecdsaysbarbadoswillnotappearonitsforthcominglist
ofuncooperativetaxhavens.htm [https://perma.cc/G48H-ZUT3]; Barbados Removed From EU’s Blacklist, INV. BARB. (May 17, 2019), https://www.invest
Barbados.org/news/barbados-removed-from-eus-blacklist/ [https://perma.cc/2D
LR-KS8N].
416 Mia Mottley, Remarks of the Honorable Mia Mottley, Attorney General &
Minister of Home Affairs of Barbados, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 411, 414 (2003).
417 See, e.g., Morriss & Moberg, supra note 328, at 11; INV. BARB., supra note
415; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 415.
418 See Mottley, supra note 416, at 416.
419 International Business Companies (Repeal) Act, 2018–40. An IBC is a
foreign company that is registered in Barbados, but does business elsewhere.
Mike Godfrey, Barbados to Shutter IBC Regime, Remove Harmful Tax Provisions
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.lowtax.net/news/Barbados-To-Shutter-IBC-Re
gime-Remove-Harmful-Tax-Provisions-96950.html [https://perma.cc/5EVS-7TTW].
These companies opt to register in Barbados because of special tax preferences
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Barbadian companies.420 The result is that “domestic and international tax rates” have converged.421
At first glance, this move appears to have undercut the
country’s status as an OFC, since there is no clear tax-related
carveout or preference for foreign business entities—one defining
feature of OFCs.422 It also undermines the argument that legislative capture explains many OFCs’ choice of legislation.423 Presumably, foreign firms, corporate lawyers and influential accounting
firms would have pushed the country’s lawmakers toward continuing to enact friendly tax legislation.424 The recent developments
in Barbados support the thesis that OFC governments tend to have
the capacity to reform in creative ways and coordinate policy goals
with the private sector efficiently.425 Three points bear highlighting
from Barbados’s legislative strategy.
First, while the corporate tax rates in Barbados are still
lower than in the United States,426 the country’s leaders perceive their advantage in the competition for IBCs as hinging on
more than just low taxes—hence their departure from the status

they receive and the country’s company laws and legal institutions. Id. According
to Invest Barbados, a government agency focused on economic development:
An International Business Company (IBC) is a company that is
licensed to carry on business in manufacturing, trade or commerce from within Barbados for customers residing outside of
Barbados. An IBC may therefore manufacture, process or otherwise prepare products for export outside of Barbados or provide services to non-residents of Barbados.
International Business Companies (IBC), GO BARB., https://barbados.org/ibc
.htm#.YTI3BdNKhQI [https://perma.cc/77RB-T4YB].
420 Henderson Holmes, Barbados: A Global Business Centre, BUS. BARB,
(Mar. 16, 2020), https://businessbarbados.com/industries/Barbados-global-busi
ness-centre/ [https://perma.cc/5XFP-7BA3].
421 Id.
422 BRUNER, supra note 7, at 48.
423 Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 114.
424 See id.
425 DIONNE & MACEY, supra note 15, at 26.
426 Corporate tax rates start at 5.00 percent on income of US $500,000 or
less, and they decrease to 1.00 percent for income above U.S. $15 million. Tax
Rates—General, INV. BARB., https://www.investbarbados.org/investing-in-bar
bados/setting-up-in-barbados/revised-tax-regime/ [https://perma.cc/84DK-LEJE].
The United States currently has a corporate tax rate of 21.00 percent. See
Curtis Dubay, Corporate Tax Rates and a Financial Transactions Tax in 2020,
112 A.B.A. BANKING J. 49, 49 (2020).
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quo.427 Second, the country has demonstrated that its real strength
resides in strategic policy making.428 More precisely, their facility
with lawmaking allows for an apparently seamless transition to
a new era in their international business pursuits that maintains complementarity between the state’s policy goals and the
legal, bureaucratic, and private sectors of the country.429 Third,
Barbados’s actions suggest that leaders have made the calculation that foreign corporations will maintain their affiliation with
the country—despite the loss of preference—because of its overarching laws and legal institutions.430 According to one commentator, “Barbados was confident in being a first mover in this tax
reformation space because it has always prided itself on being a
jurisdiction of substance rather than competing in the race to
the bottom posed by zero tax environments.”431
B. Procedural Knowledge in Cayman—Learning Through Trial
and Error Alone
While Barbados provides a ready contrast to Jamaica in its
institutional learning and subsequent development of OFC status, Cayman tells an even more compelling story. Cayman is one
of the more well-known OFCs in the world.432 While Barbados’s
institutional prowess may have evolved in part from the longterm investments in government, legal institutions, education,
as well as other facets of social life during the colonial period,433
Cayman had a different trajectory.434 Its development was fueled
427 See Holmes, supra note 420. To date, other Caribbean OFCs have not
similarly reformed the regulatory infrastructure of their offshore sector. Id.
428 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 32.
429 Id. at 83. This is unsurprising, since scholars theorize that Barbados’s
colonial past prepared the state to govern effectively and commit to the rule of
law. See id.; Daniels et al., supra note 33, at 128–36.
430 See MEDIA RES. DEPT., INDEPENDENCE RESOURCE BOOKLET 2014: CELEBRATING 375 YEARS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY & 48 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 1966–2014 5 (2014).
431 Holmes, supra note 420.
432 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1297–98; Dharmapala & Hines,
Which Countries, supra note 15, at 1066; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,
supra note 415.
433 See PATTERSON, supra note 33, at 21–27; see also Daniels et al., supra
note 33, at 131, 138–39, 159.
434 See infra Section IV.B.
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by early functional independence and the autonomy to craft an
economy and society suitable to the needs of Caymanians.435 This
likely gave its early leaders the opportunity to build their governance capabilities first hand and strategically lay the foundations
for the jurisdiction’s economic future.436 A detailed sociological
historiography of Cayman, such as the one provided by Patterson
for Barbados and Jamaica, is currently unavailable, but a few
key points about how the jurisdiction developed the state capacity
for international finance can be gleaned from the work of scholars across disciplines.437
Cayman’s development strategy was arguably inductive.438
Leaders followed opportunities where they arose and leveraged
the social and physical endowments that were available to them.439
One could articulate Cayman’s approach in terms once used to
describe China’s development: “incremental, selectively adaptive, or more perceptive.”440 As an initial matter, Cayman’s story
is extraordinary, not only because it is now recognized as one of
the top “emerging ‘laboratories’ of corporate law,”441 but because
of the jurisdiction’s growth from an early, unsophisticated history
as an isolated set of islands known for “provid[ing] turtle-meat
for ‘hungry ships’” to its current world status442 as one of the
wealthiest BOTs.443
Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1301. It bears noting that Cayman is
comprised of three islands. They are Grand Cayman, Cayman Brac and Little
Cayman. John E. Kersell, Government Administration in a Small Microstate:
Developing the Cayman Islands, 7 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 95, 97 (1987). The
islands “have a total area of approximately 100 square miles. Grand Cayman
is situated 178 miles west-nor-west of Jamaica and 480 miles south of Miami ...
largest island of the three is Grand Cayman, with an area of about 80 square
miles.” SIR VASSEL JOHNSON, AS I SEE IT: HOW CAYMAN BECAME A LEADING
FINANCIAL CENTRE 31 (2001).
436 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1301.
437 See, e.g., id. at 1339–40; Howard A. Fergus, The Cayman Islands: Britain’s
Maverick Caribbean Colony, 29 J. E. CARIBBEAN STUD. 1, 2–3 (2004).
438 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1299–300.
439 Fergus, supra note 437, at 2–3.
440 DAM, supra note 40, at 269 (noting that Deng Xiaoping has described
China’s development path as “crossing the river by feeling for stones”).
441 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1406.
442 See Fergus, supra note 437, at 2–3.
443 Id. at 2. Freyer and Morriss note that “between 1960 and 1980, the Cayman
Islands went from being of the least developed, both legally and economically,
435
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Cayman’s prominence is a product of sustained institution
building geared toward international finance in a most competitive world economy.444 Like many island colonies in the Caribbean, Cayman had minimal state capacity for development prior
to the 1960s.445 The island became a British colony in the 17th
century and quickly became a “colony of a colony” since it was
administered by the British from the colony of Jamaica.446 Curiously, perhaps because of its remoteness, the territory was effectively left to manage its own internal affairs during the early
colonial period and became known for its rugged independence.447
One scholar noted that “[e]ven [Cayman’s] governors, though responsible to the Governor of Jamaica until 1962, rarely referred
anything to Kingston and more rarely received any but the most
general instructions therefrom.”448
Unlike many British colonies in the Caribbean, Cayman
did not experience the same type of agricultural (sugar) plantation economy—primarily because its geography was not conducive to this kind of activity.449 As a result, there were fewer
slaves and more racial intermixing occurred.450 Some scholars
argue that better race relations in Cayman proved helpful where
governance was concerned, since there was less conflict around
race matters.451 A notable departure for Cayman’s governance came
in 1959, when its formal relationship with Jamaica452 came to an
end.453 Cayman sought to remain a BOT, as opposed to becoming

jurisdictions in a poorly developed region to surpassing its former colonial
power in GDP per capita terms, and developing a sophisticated body of financial law.” Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1300.
444 Fergus, supra note 437, at 1.
445 Id. at 6.
446 Id. at 2.
447 Id. at 3 (noting that “[t]he British Parliament placed [Cayman] under
the legislative authority of Jamaica in 1863”); see also Kersell, supra note
435, at 96.
448 Fergus, supra note 437, at 7 (noting that air transportation was established in the 1960s and with it “the rapid growth in tourism”).
449 Id. at 2.
450 Id. at 3.
451 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1329–30; see Kersell, supra note
435, at 97.
452 Jamaica became a sovereign country in 1962. JOHNSON, supra note 435,
at 10.
453 Id. at 112; see also Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1312–13.
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politically independent, but with greater internal autonomy over
its political and legal affairs.454
In a detailed analysis of Cayman’s development as an OFC,
Tony Freyer and Andrew Morriss highlight the efforts made by
local leaders to create a legal environment455 that balanced multiple interests.456 These included a constitutional order that “promoted a regulatory and tax competitive advantage that avoided
capture and resisted both corruption and abuse better than many
other jurisdictions.”457 Cayman’s success is likely also a product
of the country’s self-reliance and a sustained and systematic effort
to build the capacity for international business.458 Consider that,
as of the early 1800s, Cayman had a high rate of illiteracy,
lacked well-developed legislation, and arguably lacked a meaningful representative government—given that Caymanians were
governed from Jamaica.459 With no commercial banks until 1908,460
Caymanians relied on “a largely barter-based domestic economy.”461
A few remarkable steps were taken by the island’s leadership to
advance the economy from this state.462
First, during the 1960s, Cayman recognized its potential
as an OFC.463 It had developed to this point without a direct tax;
“its government’s total income was derived only from indirect
taxes.”464 Since this was a natural baseline for the country, it was
feared that any change might deter investors.465 Perhaps more
See, e.g., Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1308–16.
Freyer and Morriss used “archival sources, participant interviews, and
a wide range of other materials” in their research and analysis. Id. at 1297.
456 Id. at 1300.
457 Id.
458 Id.
459 Fergus, supra note 437, at 4–5.
460 JOHNSON, supra note 435, at 31.
461 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1305.
462 See infra notes 463–92 and accompanying text.
463 Howard Fergus notes that “[t]he Cayman Islands hit the scene as an
offshore financial center around 1966 and gained the distinction of being a
premier center after some 17 years.” Fergus, supra note 437, at 7.
464 JOHNSON, supra note 435, at 111 (noting that indirect taxes included
“customs import duty ... sale of stamps, company registration and annual fees,
banks and trust companies licensing fees, tourist accommodation tax,” etc.).
465 Id. Vassel Johnson argues that “Cayman ... developed well without the
need to introduce any form of direct taxes such as income tax, corporation
tax, capital gains tax, sales tax, inheritance tax, death dues etc.” Id.
454
455
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important, places like Bermuda, Bahamas,466 Curacao, and “the
Channel Islands and Europe generally” were already on the
path to developing a reputation as tax havens467 and provided a
ready model. Second, while pre-existing OFCs provided a road map
for the development of an international business sector,468 Cayman
had its own unique history and challenges and needed a path that
best suited its reality.469 In other words, a modified type of isomorphism was required.470 Not only did Cayman have to decide
which countries or jurisdiction to be isomorphic with, it also
needed to determine the degree to which any other OFCs path
was suitable for its political, social, and economic circumstances.471
For example, as a consequence of the severed relationship with
Jamaica, a new constitution was required that simultaneously
maintained a connection with Britain472 as a territory and
Bahamas became a sovereign country in 1973. Our History, BAHAMAS
(Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.bahamas.com/our-history [https://perma.cc/9836
-JTH3].
467 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1311.
468 See id. at 1302, 1311.
469 See Fergus, supra note 437, at 2–3 (identifying notable historical differences between Cayman and other OFCs).
470 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
471 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1300.
472 A continued connection with Britain meant that Cayman could benefit
from British legal institutions—which were credible to investors—and could
also enjoy the “collaborative promotion of the offshore financial center.” Id. at
1319. The credibility of Cayman’s legal system is connected to its “English
legal origins.” See BRUNER, supra note 7, at 29–30. There is an argument that
the common looms strong in the scholarship and policies addressing business
friendly legal institutions. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1132 (1997); La Porta et al., Economic
Consequences, supra note 180, at 287; Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory
and Evidence 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10766,
2004); DARON ACEMOGLU ET AL., A REVIEW, supra note 180, at 3; see also
Besley, supra note 180, at 101. British Overseas Territories like Cayman rely
wholly on the English common law or modifications thereof. See Michael J.
Burns & James McConvill, An Unstoppable Force: The Offshore World in a
Modern Global Economy, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 205, 219–20 (2011). This
means that legal decisions are guided by judicial rulings in England, not to
mention that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England is the
court of last resort for the vast majority of Commonwealth Caribbean OFCs.
Id. Following English law provides OFCs with “well-defined and alienable
466
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allowed for increased autonomy over domestic affairs.473 A new
companies law was also needed to allow “Cayman to register the
companies on their own, without any reference to Jamaica or
anywhere else.”474 And, on a similarly practical note, the islands
considered it beneficial to establish an airline to transport tourists and investors to its shores and found it necessary to resolve
its persistent problem with “mosquitos and sandflies.”475 The
latter solutions were crucial to welcoming tourists, a good portion of whom would be interested in the financial sector.476
Third, Cayman built a network of experts.477 With a small
population, a “nascent Civil Service,”478 few educational institutions,479 and a handful of lawyers480 on the island, outside experts
were welcomed in the early days of international business.481 Indeed, “an important source of policy innovation for Cayman was
[a] slowly growing group of expatriate professionals.”482 These
professionals would prove invaluable to the early business laws,
including “Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law” and
“Trusts Law.”483 Ultimately, Cayman created the Cayman Island
Monetary Authority (CIMA), an independent regulatory body with
a mission to ensure that international banking standards are
met and that crimes—like money laundering—are prevented.484

private property rights; [and] a formal system of contract law that facilitates
impersonal contracting”—core tenets of the New Institutional Economics
(“NIE”). Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 903. Similarly, NIE scholars
realize that the best of contract and property rules amounts to very little
without an independent and reliable judiciary to enforce them. See DAM,
supra note 40, at 93–122.
473 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1312–13.
474 Id. at 1315.
475 See Fergus, supra note 437, at 7; JOHNSON, supra note 435, at 147.
476 JOHNSON, supra note 435, at 147.
477 Id.
478 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1320.
479 See Kersell, supra note 435, at 98.
480 See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1326.
481 See id.
482 Id. at 1326, 1333.
483 Id. at 1326.
484 See About Us, CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY (Aug. 22, 2021,
2:29 PM), https://www.cima.ky/about-us [https://perma.cc/Y974-GLFP]; see also
Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1378.
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Fourth, Cayman has sought to ensure that the legislation
and regulation of the offshore sector is not captured by special
interests.485 The early days of international finance leaned heavily
on private sector experts—lawyers, accountants and bankers—
but there has subsequently been a determined and persistent
effort to keep the government at the helm of the ship and fully
in charge of the industry.486 This approach has been described
by scholars as one of “collaborative policymaking.”487 In practice,
this meant that “government and business sectors worked together to develop an effective regulatory structure that both
safeguarded the jurisdiction’s reputation and facilitated profitable financial activity that provided law firms, accountants, insurance companies, company agents, and others with profits and
the government with resources from fees.”488
This is undoubtedly a delicate balance. The government
seeks to maintain credibility in terms of transparency and fidelity to the rule of law with legitimate investors, but does not want
to overregulate.489 If it does, it could “[kill] the goose that laid
the golden eggs.”490 Political leaders are well aware of the likelihood and dangers of legislative capture and seek to minimize the
risks of too much special interest influence, while gaining from
the benefits of innovation that comes from the private sector.491
The presence of CIMA helps to ensure an acceptable standard of
quality among the banking sector and to offset the strong influence of corporate actors.492
The special interest aspect to offshore finance is compli493
cated. But, it is likely that where commentators end in their
analyses largely depends on their starting point.494 If one begins
with the assumption that the United States (or another wealthy
See JOHNSON, supra note 435, at 111–12.
See Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1301, 1388–90; see also JOHNSON,
supra note 435, at 111–12. Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1297.
487 Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1297.
488 Id. at 1301.
489 See id.
490 See id.
491 See id. at 1300.
492 See id. at 1394–95.
493 See Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1405–06.
494 See id. at 1432–33.
485
486
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nation) is the reference point for comparative analysis, there
may likely develop concerns that American special interests are
influencing the political and legal apparatus on a nearby small
island and will then depart for those shores to take advantage of
various legal and tax benefits.495 But, if one begins from the perspective of the offshore sector, it is possible to see special interests
as contributors to a vibrant and competitive sector—i.e., merely
sources of technology and not dictators of how that technology is
ultimately used.496
In summary, institutional learning is an important component of state capacity. How countries develop and the choices
they make are a function of how and what they learn along the
way.497 Two examples of institutional learning can be gleaned
from the OFCs of Barbados and Cayman.498 On the one hand,
Barbados—in contrast to Jamaica—learned the art of governance
by practicing, engaging, and building on the institutions developed by colonists during the colonial period.499 On the other hand,
Cayman learned the art of governance by trial and error through
its own determined exploration.500
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, scholarly attention has been drawn
to the development of competitive OFCs that provide sophisticated corporate law for American firms.501 While commentators
acknowledge that these jurisdictions are leading a form of revolution in the corporate law arena,502 the depth of this revolution
is not yet fully understood.503 If OFCs provide examples of good
governance, scholars, policymakers, and development practitioners
should seek to learn how these jurisdictions cultivated these governance skills for purposes of economic development.504 Instead
See id. at 1429.
See Farber, supra note 101, at 183.
497 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
498 See supra Part IV.
499 See supra text accompanying notes 383–88.
500 See supra text accompanying notes 432–34.
501 See supra text accompanying note 12.
502 See supra text accompanying note 12.
503 See supra text accompanying notes 21–22.
504 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
495
496
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of focusing exclusively on where American firms are inclined to
incorporate, greater scholarly effort should also be focused on why
some OFCs are more successful than others and, specifically, what
role their internal capabilities play in the process.505
This Article introduced the concept of state capacity to the
legal academic discourse on OFCs and suggests that state capacity
can be conceptualized as a jurisdiction’s manner of institutional
learning.506 Under this approach, it is possible to unpack the development trajectory of prominent OFCs to understand how the
leaders in these jurisdictions have managed to effectively coordinate
network externalities, the immense pressures of corporate interests, and the need to choose appropriate business legislation.
Perhaps it has been difficult to analyze OFC development
objectively because of the predominant assumption of some scholars
and policymakers about the character of the international economy.507 There is an implicit understanding of the United States—
and the Global North more generally—as the default reference
points from which all other countries and regulations should be
judged.508 In other words, legitimacy is assessed from and by the
standards of Western countries and institutions. Hence, other
jurisdictions—particularly small OFCs in the Global South—are
viewed as “offshore,” both geographically and maybe even as a
metaphor for being on the periphery of world power, technological advancement, and even morals.509
While some scholars argue for the right of OFCs to create
their own rules,510 concerns have been raised as to the laxity of the
laws in these jurisdictions and the potential harm these jurisdictions may bring to American corporations—and, by extension,
See supra text accompanying note 54.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
507 See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 98 (2002).
508 Id.
509 See, e.g., Meyer et al., supra note 141, at 158; Terence K. Hopkins &
Immanuel Wallerstein, Patterns of Development of the Modern Worlds-System, 1
REV. (FERNAND BRAUDEL CTR.) 111, 113 (1977); see also Steven A. Dean,
FATCA, the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus, and the OECD Blacklist, 168
TAX NOTES FED. 95 (2020).
510 See, e.g., Morris, Regulatory Competition, supra note 155, at 102–46.
505
506

2021]

STATE CAPACITY

263

American society.511 A view of OFCs from the theoretical frame
of state capacity may provide new insights to the ongoing discourse—as well as reorient our collective scholarly perspective.
OFCs are jurisdictions like many others with strengths
and weaknesses, but their importance has been underappreciated due to a sordid narrative focused on criminality and permissive laws.512 The tales of tax evasion and other crime generally
associated with OFCs imply that only a small group of wealthy
companies and individuals, as well as well-placed policymakers
and professionals in these jurisdictions, gain from the sector.513
Arguably, since William Cary broached the phenomenon of a race
among American states for corporate charters, attention has been
skewed to a narrow set of potential winners and losers.514 But as
we enter a period in American life, and across the world for that
matter, where there is a growing interest in inequality and inclusive economic growth,515 there is reason to ask if regulatory
competition should serve a larger public purpose.
It is important to note that the state capacity framework
that this Article proposes is not meant to be normative. Sociologists Miguel Centeno and Elaine Enriquez suggest: “whether a
state uses its capacity to enact policy preferences for ‘good’ or ‘bad’
ends does not negate the empirical reality of that state’s ability.”516 Notwithstanding, it bears inquiring into what kind of state
can promote the type of regulatory competition that brings forth
flourishing to a wide swath of its citizens without making private sector, unelected actors de facto legislators.517
511 See, e.g., Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 1, at 1453; see
also Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 5, at 17.
512 See Morriss, Regulatory Competition, supra note 155, at 102.
513 See, e.g., Valpy FitzGerald & Erika Dayle Siu, The Effects of International Tax Competition on National Income Distribution, in INTERNATIONAL
POLICY RULES AND INEQUALITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE (Jose Antonio Ocampo ed., 2019).
514 See, e.g., Cary, supra note 2, at 701.
515 The Case for Inclusive Growth, MCKINSEY & CO. (April 28, 2021), https://
www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/the-case
-for-inclusive-growth [https://perma.cc/JUP3-2M87].
516 Enriquez & Centeno, supra note 176, at 136.
517 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 149–55 (1999);
GREGORY ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 1044 (2018) (discussing how property law can be used to facilitate flourishing among property
owners and non-property owners alike).
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If jurisdictions like Cayman and Barbados, with humble
origins, can enhance their economic fortunes in a just a few decades,518 scholars should be eager to study how their policy choices
regarding offshore finance are socially embedded in—and therefore
influenced by—their lived reality.519 Perhaps the most obvious
implication of this Article is that OFCs are a law and development success story520—but only if we appreciate that legal institutions are only as good as the actors willing and capable of using
them effectively.

See, e.g., Freyer & Morriss, supra note 125, at 1300.
See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 176, at 5.
520 See, e.g., Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 902–04.
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